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Abstract
Looking across the 20th century, this thesis seeks to understand the
relationship African Americans developed between automobility and the fight for
civil rights, filling a gap left in the historiography of both the automobile and the
Civil Rights Movement. Historians of the automobile have almost exclusively focused
their lens on white suburbia and the “autotopias” that Americans created, while
historians of the Civil Rights Movement ignored the automobile entirely. This thesis
hopes to begin to fill that void by explaining how African Americans exploited the
technological system of the automobile to create forms of transportation accessible
to African American communities, yet separate from segregated public
transportation systems. African Americans used the automobile to repeatedly
undermine white authority that dominated the spaces of public transportation.
African Americans were not absent from the story of the automobile rather the
transformative technological system was perhaps more powerful from African
Americans than any other group of people. They actively used cars to change the
rules that governed legal and social interaction between themselves and whites.
Almost as soon as the automobile was invented, African Americans used the
technological system to assert power for themselves and developed transportation
options and corporations aimed at giving African American options not governed by
White Authority. The first of these options was the exploitation of jitney buses
(automobiles outfitted for maximum passenger capacity) to challenge the
segregated streetcars that dominated urban transportation in the early 1900s.

v

African Americans also gained agency and power through the pooling of
resources, particularly in the form of a carpool that financially crippled the
Montgomery public bus company and forced segregation into a national
conversation on the tails of the Brown v. Board decision and became one of the first
applications of law that tested the Supreme Court’s stance on segregation.
African American history and the story of the automobile are not mutually
exclusive, rather are intricately connected. This connection can be ignored no
longer.

vi
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Introduction
This study examines the historical relationship between power, race, and
technology through a study of African Americans’ use of automobiles to combat
segregation in public transportation—and by extension public space—during the
first half of the twentieth century. The rise of segregation in the 1880s was not
inevitable. It was a system built from active choices aimed at re-cementing African
Americans into second-class status following the gains of Reconstruction.1 Whites
wrote and voted segregation laws into city codes and state constitutions, helping to
create what many southerners called, “the Southern way.” 2 White supremacy
however was not limited to the South and dominated the political and social order
of major swaths of the United States.3 Whites dictated where African Americans
could and could not reside, shop, eat, worship and even school their children.
Whites could move freely through the resulting black-dominated communities
without facing legal or violent retaliation while African Americans faced arrest,
physical abuse, or death should they enter spaces deemed white only. However,
with the rise of Jim Crow, came resistance to the laws of segregation. African
Americans organized opposition, often pooling resources from a network of people
that spanned across class, age, and gender. 4 They took steps to challenge

This is not to say that Reconstruction was a success, but certainly African Americans for a short
period gained constitutional rights, ones for which they would and still continue to fight.
2 J.R. Robinson Sr. to Montgomery City Bus Lines, March 14, 1956, J.H. Bagley Papers, Alabama
Department of Archives and History (ADAH), Montgomery, Alabama.
3 Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2005, 15. In this work Self explores the relationship of segregation in liberalism
through his focus on control over space in Oakland, CA. Self explains that segregation, while not law,
still dominated many aspects of social and lived space in cities outside of the South.
4 An astute study of African Americans resource pooling can be found in Allison Calhoun-Brown,
“African American Churches and Political Mobilization: The Psychological Impact of Organizational
1
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segregation on every level; the battleground for resistance was just as likely to be
found on city streets as it was to be found in courtrooms. 5 Well documented by
historians, successful resistance to segregation required African Americans to know
and use the law.6 Yet in day-to-day encounters with segregation, as well as
organized campaigns against it, African Americans took advantage of a powerful
technological system in their resistance to and subversion of Jim Crow segregation,
one that has come to define daily transportation across America: the automobile.7

Resources,” The Journal of Politics 58, no. 4 (November, 1996), 945. In this study, Calhoun-Brown
examines the networking and pooling of resources conducted through African American religious
organizations, placing emphasis on churches as community centers for social and economic
organization.
5 Scholars have done a phenomenal job of documenting the diverse forms resistance to segregation.
Paul Gilroy, “Driving While Black” in Car Cultures (New York: Berg, 2001) specifically ties the
automobile to resistance of segregation and other forms of white power and argues this resistance is
a contributing factor to the reason that African Americans make up 30% of those who purchase
automobiles but only make up 12% of the population. Resistance to streetcar segregation is
specifically analyzed in Blair Murphy Kelly, Right to Ride: Streetcar Boycotts and African American
Citizenship in the Era of Plessy V. Ferguson (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010);
Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life After Reconstruction (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992); Neil R. McMillen, Dark Journey: Black Mississippians in the Age of Jim Crow
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989); August Meier and Elliott Rudwick’s, "The Boycott
Movement against Jim Crow Streetcars in the South, 1900-1906," The Journal of American History 55,
no.4 (March 1969): 756-775; Ross D. Eckert and George W. Hilton, “The Jitneys,” Journal of Law and
Economics 15, no. 2 (October 1972): 293-325 which demonstrate the creativity and resourcefulness
that African Americans brought to the fight against streetcar segregation. A fantastic introduction to
the various forms of resistance that African Americans utilized in the struggle for civil rights can be
gained from John Hope Franklin and Evelyn Higginbotham, From Slavery to Freedom: The Story of
African Americans, 9th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2010) which is a helpful reference to any
historian studying African American history.
6 The role of the legal system in the struggle for civil rights is beyond extensive. Historical works that
document this relationship are Glenn Feldman eds., Before Brown: Civil Rights and White Backlash in
the Modern South (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2004; Richard Kluger, Simple
Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality (New
York: Random House inc., 2004); Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and
the Supreme Court, 1936-1961 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Alexander Tsesis, We Shall
Overcome: A history of Civil Rights and the Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); Herman
Mason Jr., Politics, Civil Rights and Law in Black Atlanta, 1870-1970 (Charleston, SC: Arcadia
Publishing, 2000); Burt M. Reiff, “Browder v. Gale: The Legal Vehicle of the Montgomery Bus
Boycott,” Alabama Review 41, no.1 (Spring 1998): 193-208; Robert Jerome Glennon, “The Role of Law
in the Civil Rights Movement,” Law and History Review 9, no. 2 (1991): 59-112.
7 One of the pioneering works in regards to the analysis of physical artifacts is Langdon Winner, “Do
Artifacts have politics?,” Daedalus 109, no. 1 (Winter, 1980): 121-136 in which Winner demonstrates
how African Americans were the victims of power gained through technology and the ways in which
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Historians have largely focused their attention regarding the automobile on white
motorists, white car culture, and on white flight to suburban “autotopias.” However
recent scholarship has begun to stray away from this problematic schema, providing
more attention to minorities and their cars. 8 For decades, the automobile served as
a powerful tool in the fight against segregation. Black automobility threatened white
control over space, one of the core sources of power underpinning Jim Crow
segregation. However, African Americans’ challenge to Jim Crow in the form of black
automobility came with limitations. Cars could not ensure success or safety. The
automobile could not help James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwerner
the night the Ku Klux Klan ripped them from their car and murdered the three

technology limited the abilities and agency of African Americans but as Rayvon Fouché, “Say it Loud,
I’m Black and I’m Proud: African Americans, American Artifactual Culture, and Black Vernacular
Technological Creativity,” American Quarterly 58, no. 3 (September 2006): 639-661 points out,
African Americans also gained agency and power through the use of technology and the automobile
was one of the systems that African Americans successfully utilized in efforts to mitigate and
circumvent white supremacy as manifested in Jim Crow laws.
8 There is deep historiography on minority car culture that historians have developed in the past
fifteen years and a good introduction can be found in Paul Gilroy, “Driving While Black” in Daniel
Miller eds., Car Cultures (New York: Berg, 2001) in which Gilroy searches for an understanding to
why African-Americans make up a disproportionate number of car owners in the United States.
Gilroy briefly explains that historians can no longer ignore the automobile as an important
technological system in the lives of African Americans, and challenges historians particularly in the
field of vernacular history to look closer at cars in black culture. Five years after the publication of
Gilroy’s challenge Rayvon Fouché began to address similar themes. In Rayvon Fouché, “Say it Loud,
I’m Black and I’m Proud: African Americans, American Artifactual Culture, and Black Vernacular
Technological Creativity” American Quarterly 58, no. 3 (September 2006): 639-661 Fouché focuses
his lens on African American technological culture, and while he does not specifically focus on the
automobile, he begins the process of understanding the ways and language in which African
Americans and African American communities have thought and expressed their thoughts about
artifacts of technology. Ben Chappell, Lowrider Space: Aesthetics and Politics of Mexican American
Custom Cars (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 2013) applies exactly what Gilroy called for in
regard to African Americans to the culture of Latino Americans particularly in the custom lowriders
that, as Chappell argues erect images of gangsters in the minds of white, middle class Americans.
Chappell analyses the interaction between lowriders and both physical and audiological space, as
well as a host of historical factors leading to their proliferation in certain Mexican American
communities.
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young men.9 Yet for more than half a century, African Americans gained power,
mobility, and authority over space through the use of the technological system of the
automobile as a means of challenging Jim Crow segregation.
The study that follows began as an investigation into how African Americans
used the automobile to challenge segregation during the seminal yearlong boycott of
buses in 1956 Montgomery and evolved into a much larger story. This study’s scope
spans the first half of the 20th century, and focuses on African Americans’ sustained
use

of

automobile

technology

to

challenge

the

segregation

of

public

transportation—including streetcar lines and buses—that treated them as secondclass citizens. Through the exploitation of a growing web of automobile technology
African Americans fought Jim Crow transportation demanding better for themselves
and their communities. Some of the most significant gains of power, mobility, and
authority over space were made following this exploitation, and it is in this context
that this study seeks to complicate familiar stories, looking at the challenge for Civil
Rights through the lenses of spatial and technological history.
Power, mobility, and authority are loaded and ambiguous terms, so it is
important to discuss their direct meaning as they pertain to this study. Power is
used throughout this study in the context of Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory.
Giddens’ theory is well summarized by historian Kevin Borg who explains that,
“Structuration, in Giddens’ use of the term is a process: the ongoing, dynamic use,

Claude Sitton, “Experts Identify Mississippi Bodies as Rights Aides’,” New York Times, August 6,
1964 http://www.nytimes.com/1964/08/06/experts-identify-mississippi-bodies-as-rightsaides.html (accessed April 8, 2015)
9
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reproduction, and mutation of tacit rules of routine social interaction.”10 In this way,
white supremacy became the implicit rules that dominated social interactions
between whites and African Americans, and power can be understood as the ability
to reinforce or to challenge the rules of those interactions. Resources of power can
be used to change structures and relationships.

Subversive power can be

understood as the ability to upset even a small part of the social rules of white
supremacy. African Americans gained such power through a variety of means
ranging from writings letters demanding that streetcar operators curb their abusive
behavior, to organizing massive boycotts designed to force the integration of city
buses. Each draws on different resources of power: from language and discourse to
technology and money.
While power is a term that historians use with regularity, the study of
mobility is a more recent development.11 Historians predominately utilize mobility
to explain movement through and between social classes, however in the context of
African Americans’ struggle against segregation, mobility should be understood as
the ability to navigate through contested space. Studying automobility can thus do
more than document the rise of a suburban nation by specifically analyzing mobility
through, or within, contested space. Space in turn is best defined in the context of
Michel Foucault’s discussions on heterotopia. Foucault explained that space can be
conceived as, “a set of relations” inherently tied to geographic concepts of physical

For a discussion on the usefulness to historians of Giddens’ structuration theory and an example of
such theory applied to a study regarding both race, technology, and the linking of social control and
space see Kevin Borg, “The ‘Chauffer Problem’ in the Early Auto Era: Structuration Theory and the
Users of Technology,” Technology and Culture 40, no. 4 (October, 1999): 797-832.
11 One indication of this is the 2000 launch of Transfers: Interdisciplinary Journal of Mobility Studies.
10
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space. The differences in space are laid out by Henri Lefebrve who established three
categorical distinctions regarding space: physical space as perceived space, mental
space as conceived space, and social space as lived space.12 In places and spaces
examined in the following study, the three categories collide. Physical space can be
found on the seats of buses, on the roads of cities, and in the pews of churches but
become social space with the introduction of human agents, while simultaneously
following the rules of mental space. The structuration of such spaces in this study is
understood as the dynamic interaction of actors employing differing resources of
power and authority over the lived spaces of black and white urban mobility. Those
who create the rules of the mental space within these physical and social spaces
hold the authority and thus dominate power by defining interactions within those
spaces, until met by novel applications of countervailing resources.
Racial segregation violated the basic idea of an inherent right granted by the
U. S. Constitution. Habeas corpus, literally translating from Latin to “that you have
the body,” typically was and is legally applied to detainment and imprisonment. But
its basic meaning falls upon the freedom of movement, of mobility.13 By denying
African Americans the right to move freely through spaces, those who championed
segregation deprived African Americans of habeas corpus. In the system of
segregation, African Americans held no authority over their own bodies. Rather
their bodies were subjected to white authority. Much like in antebellum slavery,

Both Foucault’s definition of space and Henri Lefebvre’s conceptions of space are gleaned from
Miriam Kahn, “Tahiti Intertwined: Ancestral Land, Tourist Postcard, and Nuclear Test Site,” American
Anthropologist 102, no.1 (March 2000): 7-26.
13 Wex Legal Dictionary, Legal Information Institute, Cornell University Law School
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/habeas_corpus (accessed April 1, 2015)
12
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whites dictated the spaces acceptable for the movement and residence of black
bodies. That Jim Crow segregation arose in the 1870s and took hold in the 1890s is
largely uncontested, but the question of why segregation took a firm grip over city
and state politics remains hotly debated. It seems directly counter to the rules of
slavery, in which slaves often worked alongside their masters, and lived in close
proximity to whites, and historians have struggled to explain and understand how
such a change took place in the late nineteenth century.
C. Vann Woodward was one of the first historians to tackle the issue, and his
1954 work, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, laid out reasons and ways that
segregation took hold of the South. Woodward contended that segregation
developed gradually and primarily through social attitudes that sought to unify
white southerners. Social attitudes pitted whites against African Americans and in
turn the goal of whites became to separate themselves from African Americans.
Woodward argued that southern whites saw Reconstruction as a disruption to
otherwise normal relations between the races, and that it was only when the
“carpetbaggers” left the South that race relations returned to their natural state. The
question then remained: why did segregation, a system that did not exist under
slavery, take such a strong hold of southern race relations? Woodward agreed that
segregation during slavery was “impractical” and that the establishment of
segregation was not a restoration of race relations following Reconstruction but
rather a new establishment that used the same hierarchical structure.14

W C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955)
13-14.
14
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Woodward argued that segregation began gradually, first occurring in
Protestant churches through, “the voluntary withdrawal of the Negroes and their
establishment of independent organizations of their own.”15 This line of thinking
seems to hold water. African Americans likely did not view their former masters as
friendly neighbors with whom they wanted to share their life experiences. After
being forced to work and live in close proximity to those who withheld freedom and
human rights, African Americans opted out, and physically removed themselves
from some the spaces shared by whites. Woodward further argued that segregation
of public schools was created during Reconstruction as a means of educating African
Americans, and constructing a system in which they would have a sense of safety.
Furthermore the segregation of military units in the Civil War did not vanish, but
rather became the model that the armed forces would rely upon for over eighty
years. However, despite these first early instances of segregation, Jim Crowism did
not take the south by storm. On the contrary, many southerners held philosophies
regarding race relations that often strongly opposed segregation. These practices
often included remnants of paternalistic ideology, placing whites as the custodians
of African Americans, and “burdened” whites with the responsibility of pulling
African Americans up and out of slavery and into their modern ideal of civil rights.
Woodward was quick to point out that while some origins of segregation can be
found in the Reconstruction period, the South developed the policies of segregationas-law decades after Reconstruction, and while racism reigned supreme,

15

Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 15.
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segregation was not the immediate answer for the South. But how then did Jim Crow
become universal law?16
Woodward explains, “all the elements of fear, jealousy, proscription, hatred
and fanaticism had long been present. . . . What enabled them [whites] to rise to
dominance was not so much cleverness or ingenuity as it was a general weakening
and discrediting of the numerous forces that had hitherto kept them in check.” 17
According to Woodward, African Americans’ civil rights were chipped away rather
than being revoked all at once. Prior to segregation came disenfranchisement.
Woodward then explains that following disenfranchisement came physical attacks
on African Americans as mob violence in the form of riots and lynching became
common practice within the South.18 It was only then that segregation was allowed
to take hold in the South, gradually moving from state to state, and according to
Woodward, the older states such as Virginia and South Carolina were the last to
adopt segregation as law, whereas newer states such as Mississippi began to call for
Jim Crow segregation in the 1880s.19
Woodward is not the only historian to adopt this view of the rise of
segregation. In The Promise of the New South: Life After Reconstruction, Edward L.
Ayers states that, “segregation begun in the decade following the end of the Civil
War did not spread inexorably and evenly across the face of the South. The 1880s

Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 13-15; 19-33; 47.
Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 51.
18 Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 71. It is important to note here that lynching was not
confined to the South but rather became prominent across the United States predominantly targeting
African Americans as well as Mexican Americans, migrant workers and Latino immigrants.
19 Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 79.
16
17
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saw much uncertainty and much bargaining, many forays and retreats.” 20 Ayers is in
agreement

with Woodward.

Both see

segregation

as

beginning during

Reconstruction but evolving through the 1880s and 1890s taking hold in the latter
part. Both agree that it was social anxieties and behaviors that led to Jim Crow
segregation. Ayers describes more specifically how segregation took place and for
Ayers transportation was key. Railways were the first to see segregation laws
because they were unavoidable physical spaces of black and white interaction.
Ayers explains, “While some blacks resisted their exclusion from white-owned
hotels and restaurants, they could find and often preferred accommodations in
black-run businesses. Travel was a different story, for members of both races had no
choice but to use the same railroads. . . . By all accounts, the railroads of the 1880s
were contested terrain.”21 Ayers correctly identifies railways as a different sphere of
segregation, and I hope to extend that argument to the streetcars and buses, with
automobiles as the primary tool used to combat segregation within those physical
spaces. While Woodward laid out the map and path of Jim Crow segregation, he
failed to explain why segregation specifically took hold. Ayers filled that gap, arguing
that segregation as a social practice evolved into law when it became inconvenient
or impossible for segregation to take place in certain spaces. Economic efficiencies
of particular forms of transportation including railroads, streetcars, and later buses
constrained the voluntary removal of African Americans from spaces aboard public
transportation shared by whites and vice versa. What Ayers does not note however

20
21

Ayers, The Promise of the New South, 135.
Ayers, The Promise of the New South, 137.
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is that segregation was not desired by all or even necessarily a majority of whites,
rather the possibility for some whites to segregate themselves from African
Americans was seen as a necessity. Since some whites desired to be segregated from
African Americans, they demanded the ability to do so, an ability that did not
informally occur on railroads, or streetcars, which were new spaces of the post Civil
War generation. Once segregated, these spaces would serve as models to transfer
spatial rules to the buses that came later.
Federal segregation developed not long after the establishment of
segregation on railways and streetcars, and unsurprisingly, it was the use of these
transportation technologies that brought forth the first Supreme Court ruling
dealing with segregation.

Plessy v. Ferguson stemmed from Homer A. Plessy’s

attempt to ban segregation laws from railroads, however the ruling instead gave
federal backing to the state and city laws that established segregation as the
dominant spatial rule on public transportation. The Court’s reasoning was also then
extended to other public spaces, leading to a legally segregated south.22
The first use of automobiles to resist segregation came as whites linked the
racialized system of Jim Crow to urban streetcar lines. Streetcars did not just
happen to become segregated. As streetcar companies sought to downsize their
larger cars, adopting smaller cars known as “one-man cars” or “safety cars.” These
cars were more cost effective as they allowed the streetcar to be operated by one
driver, and thus companies saved money. However the cars also contained less
interior space and fewer seats, requiring closer proximity of passengers. White
22

Homer Adolph Plessy v. John H. Ferguson.
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passengers voiced increased concern about sitting close to black passengers, and
even more concern about the fact that the “safety cars” were constructed with only
one door. This meant that African American patrons would use the same entrance as
white patrons, increasing interaction even more.23 These concerns inspired more
permanent fixtures of segregation to be built onto the streetcars in the forms of
signs denoting black and white seats. This is the system that stirred African
Americans’ strongest resistance, as mechanized transportation had become
necessary to urban life in many major cities by the turn of the twentieth century.
African Americans in cities across the south enacted boycotts against the
streetcars and used modified automobiles known as “jitneys” as substitutes to the
streetcars. 24 Jitney companies offered customers rides in automobiles retrofitted to
hold the maximum number of passengers. The jitneys were a fairly successful
technological system regardless of whether passengers and drivers alike used them
to challenge segregation, or provide passengers of any race with a more direct, less
crowded, and more private means to their destination. Yet under the guise of public
safety they were largely done away with. Whites created laws that regulated jitneys
to the point of virtually outlawing them. Nonetheless for the time that jitneys were
used to circumvent segregated streetcars, African Americans empowered
themselves, and also injected money into black businesses. The new technology of

“Birmingham’s Race Problem: Company Will Try Out Twenty-Five One-Man Cars Using New
Equipment for Segregation” Electrical Railway Journal 54, no. 22 (1919), 1064.
24 These augmented automobiles came to be known as “jitneys” as they typically charged a nickel,
colloquially termed a jitney, for each ride. It is not truly clear whether the buses or nickels were first
called jitneys. Multiple etymology dictionaries bring up this contention, but typically side with the
idea that the buses acquired the name from the coin. Douglas Harper, “jitney” Online Etymology
Dictionary, 2014 http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=jitney (accessed April 6, 2015)
23
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the automobile—in particular its rail-free mobility and relative inexpense—injected
new resources that African American reformers employed to challenge the system
of segregation. African Americans used jitney buses to offer black passengers spaces
free of legal segregation, and provided a cheap means to escape the streetcars.
While the black jitney companies were almost entirely done away with in the wake
of increased regulation—a result of countervailing mobilization of resources by
whites—it was not the last time black resistance to segregation used the automobile
as a tool of mobility and power in the fight for civil rights. But for the time being
racial segregation of passenger space on public transportation was established and
cemented on the streetcars and in the stations.25
By the middle decades of the century, many cities replaced streetcars with
buses. When faced with physical abuses and segregation on public bus lines, African
Americans in Montgomery, Alabama started the Montgomery Bus Boycott using the
car as a tool to subvert segregated public transportation. Beginning in 1955 and
lasting an entire year, the black citizens of Montgomery organized and ran a carpool
that employed over 400 cars with hundreds of drivers transporting thousands of
passengers.26 This was a much larger and more concentrated effort than any of the
individual jitney lines that were launched in scattered southern cities in the early
The intersection between race and automobility has not been completely ignored. An introduction
to this can be found in Paul Gilroy, “Driving While Black” in Daniel Miller eds., Car Cultures (New
York: Berg, 2001); Kathleen Franz, “The Open Road: Automobility and Racial Uplift in the Interwar
Years” in Bruce Sinclair eds., Technology and the African American Experience: Needs and Opportunity
for Study (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004; Rayvon Fouché, “Say it Loud, I’m Black and I’m Proud:
African Americans, American Artifactual Culture, and Black Vernacular Technological Creativity”
American Quarterly 58, no. 3 (September 2006): 639-661; Ben Chappell, Lowrider Space: Aesthetics
and Politics of Mexican American Custom Cars (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 2013)
26 Xavier Macy, Montgomery Bus Boycott Carpool Database (MBBCD) in this database in which
hundreds of cars are listed from data collected from police reports filed by police and supplemented
by city directories to fill gaps left by police such as the race and sex of the driver.
25
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1900s. In Montgomery the carpool was the most important element of the boycott;
without it the boycott would not have succeeded. African Americans used the
carpool to provide Montgomery’s black population with a viable substitute to the
segregated buses, which like the streetcars in the early 1900s, were necessary to
daily life. Every day, the boycotters piled cars full of black passengers and traveled
to over thirty different stops around the city. Police officers followed close behind,
harassing the boycotters through traffic stops, tickets, and arrests. The police
mounted a surveillance campaign against the boycott, and dedicated their resources
to forcing African Americans out of the cars of the carpool and back onto the buses
controlled by whites. African Americans’ pooled their knowledge and financial, legal,
and social resources, thereby keeping the boycotters one step ahead of the police.
The modus operandi for police during the boycott was constant inspection of
African American motorists, yet simultaneously the same African American drivers
provided authorities with prepared answers that kept the carpool within the
framework of existing Montgomery laws.
While this study does not focus solely on the Montgomery Bus Boycott, a
discussion of the historiography pertaining to the boycott is required. Too often has
the assumption been that everything has been written about the boycott, when in
reality there is still much to learn about this seemingly familiar story. The
boycotters played a formative role in challenging Jim Crow and thus they warrant
sustained attention in order to understand how African Americans gained civil
rights through the technological system of the automobile.

15
The Montgomery Bus Boycott has been heralded by historians as one of the
most important events in the Civil Rights Movement. It has been seen by some as the
first true beginning of the movement, and as the first leadership role of one of the
most iconic figures in both the movement and United States history in general:
Martin Luther King Jr.27 Despite all of this, historians have largely ignored the dayto-day workings of the bus boycott, as there is not a single credible historical work
dedicated to understanding the nuances of the critical year-long struggle.
Furthermore, the carpool—the tool for mobility and empowerment, and the
medium to most strongly challenge white supremacy—has rarely made an
appearance in the historiography and has never benefited from any sustained
analysis, especially regarding the interplay between race and technology.
While the historiography lacks studies singularly devoted to the boycott,
attention to the boycott can be found between the pages of many biographies and
monographs dedicated to the Civil Rights Movement. The most successful of these
include, King: A critical Biography by David Levering Lewis, Bearing the Cross:
Martin Luther King Jr., and The Southern Christian Leadership Conference both by
David J. Garrow, and of course Parting the Waters: America in the King Years: 19541963 by the most prominent historian of Martin Luther King Jr., Taylor Branch.
One work that describes the boycott in some detail comes from one of the
boycotts leaders, Martin Luther King Jr. In his 1958 book, Stride Toward Freedom:
The Montgomery Story, King gives a firsthand account of the boycott from the

Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years 1954-1963 (New York: Simon &
Schuster Inc., 1989, 78.
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perspective of the MIA’s leader and the public face of the boycott.28 King recalled the
carpool and the inner workings of the boycott just two years after its conclusion,
leaving historians with an important and informative eyewitness account. Yet,
lacking the perspective of time, it leaves many questions still unanswered.
Coming only two years after King’s assassination, Lewis’ biography, King,
provided one of the first critical approaches to Martin Luther King Jr., and unlike the
few works prior was not solely created to praise the life and times of the iconic
figure.29 King served as more than just a biography of the man that became and has
remained the face of the Civil Rights Movement. Lewis also created a work that
effectively analyzed the Martin Luther King Jr.’s leading role in many events of the
Civil Rights Movement, not fearing to also examine some actions outside the King’s
reach in order to provide necessary context.
While Lewis’ inaugural work was a good beginning to understanding the
Montgomery Bus Boycott and the Civil Rights Movement, it left historians with
questions that needed more nuanced, analytical answers. Lewis acknowledged the
existence and importance of the carpool during the bus boycott, but limited its
significance to merely an option to walking and more a symbol than a foundational
element in the boycott. Lewis argued, “Many people had chosen to walk to work to
advertise their resolve, but they did not walk every day. Furthermore the car pool
was symbolic of the boycotts success and efficiency . . . blacks knew they had the

Martin Luther King Jr., Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story (New York: Ballantine
Books, 1958)
29 David Lettering Lewis, King: A Critical Biography (New York: Allen Lane, 1970), 67.
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option of riding in a spanking new MIA station wagon or a private citizen’s auto.” 30
While it is encouraging to find reference to the carpool, Lewis provided only a
cursory understanding of the organized transportation system, with no reference to
how the carpool was planned, operated, funded, run, or targeted by the police. Lewis
did note that the city attempted to outlaw the carpools, but failed to explain how
Montgomery officials set out to do so and never mentioned the organized police
campaign against the carpool.31 Lewis also focused solely upon the leadership of the
boycott. This is understandable considering the biographical lens of his study. While
biographies can be useful for understanding certain individuals in history, the same
strength gained through specificity of focus can also be a weakness in distorting the
views of history presented. The boycott certainly needed leadership, but was born
out of the participation and activism of Montgomery’s black community. Leaders
would have been meaningless had the masses decided that the fight against Jim
Crow was not worth it. And the challenge to segregation would have been fleeting if
every boycotting black working in the city had had to walk every day. Without the
African Americans of Montgomery, Martin Luther King Jr. may never have gained
national prominence, and most assuredly the leaders of the Civil Rights Movement
would be powerless without the masses of participants.
Although Lewis’ biography of Martin Luther King Jr. was the first of its kind,
it most certainly was not the last. Taylor Branch’s body of work on King is nothing
short of astounding. Branch’s four works spanning the life of King are the essential
King: A Critical Biography, 78.
This is likely because the sources that would speak to this police campaign have gone undiscovered
by academia until now.
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monographs used when examining King’s life and the Civil Rights Movement.
Branch provides complex analysis of the events in which King played a major role,
crafting a compelling narrative to draw in readers. Branch’s volumes on King are
masterful, but Montgomery is relegated to Parting the Waters where it is largely
used to introduce the young minister and mark his emergence as a leader.32 He does
not provide much commentary on the carpool itself and, similar to Lewis, focuses
more on the leadership of the boycott, particularly Martin Luther King Jr.33 The
chapter dedicated to the Montgomery Bus Boycott paints a clear picture of the
events associated with boycott, including the carpool. But again it fails to provide
the carpool, or automobiles in general, with any sustained analysis and lacks the
necessary sources to give any meaningful detail on the police campaign against the
boycott. Thus it overlooks the power dynamics that shifted due to the automobile.
This is unsurprising as Branch’s goal was not to examine understandings of power
in the Montgomery Bus Boycott, but rather to show King’s role in the boycott and
the Civil Rights Movement as a whole.
Branch’s work came during an eruption of attention being paid to the Civil
Rights Movement, and much of that attention fell upon Martin Luther King Jr. Two
other historians, David Garrow and Adam Fairclough similarly focused on King, but
did so in an effort to diminish King’s role in the Movement. As historian Richard H.
King explains in his review of Branch’s work, “Their [Garrow and Fairclough]
purpose lay more in minimizing the importance of King as a great leader and in
Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years 1954-1963 (New York: Simon &
Schuster Inc., 1989)
33 Taylor Branch, 145.
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underscoring the extent to which he was, as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee (SNCC) mentor, Ella Baker, asserted, ‘Made by the Movement.’”34 Branch
hoped to counter this view of King in Parting the Waters, instead placing King as
“the best and most important metaphor for American history in the watershed
postwar years.”35 This explains Branch’s focus on King throughout Parting the
Waters, and his particular emphasis on King’s role in the bus boycott. While the
question of King’s role in the Civil Rights Movement is an important one, the answer
will not be found in this study which seeks instead to examine the relationship
between power, race, and technology.
The other two aforementioned authors’ works, while strong in their own
right, give little attention to the carpool that made the bus boycott possible.
Garrow’s Bearing the Cross and Fairclough’s To Redeem the Soul of America both
mention the carpool, but similar to branch provide only a rough chronology and
passing comments regarding the organized transportation without providing any
analytical understandings. For Garrow and Fairclough, the carpool is an important
facet of the boycott, but the power dynamics of the carpool go ignored. Furthermore,
neither of the authors examines the police campaign against the carpool.36 While
Garrow describes King being pulled over by the police, he attributes this to general

Richard H. King, “Review of Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-63 by Taylor
Branch” The Journal of American History 70, no. 1 (June, 1990): 267, www.jstor.org
35 Branch, Parting the Waters, xii.
36 This is the standard treatment of the Montgomery Bus Boycott. Another biography, Jeanne
Theoharis, The Rebellious Life of Mrs. Rosa Parks (Boston: Beacon Press, 2013) similarly gave details
about the carpool as well as police harassment but does not provide any analysis as to the meaning of
African Americans utilizing the automobile as a tool for empowerment. Furthermore Theoharis
glosses over the sheer magnitude and importance of the carpool giving more credence again to
leadership in the boycott.
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police harassment, ignoring that cars are at the heart of the issue, and that the police
department is obsessed with them.37
Following the publication of Fairclough, Garrow, and Branch’s respective
works, Historian David Chappell sought to fill some of the gaps left in the
historiography. Chappell’s biography of King, A Stone of Hope: Prophetic Religion and
the Death of Jim Crow, focuses on King through religion and rhetoric.38 Due to this
focus, in the context of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, Chappell examines the rhetoric
of Sunday mass and the mass meetings carefully, but does not give much attention
to any of the products of those meetings, particularly omitting the carpools from his
sections dealing with the boycott. Chappell is however aware of the carpool, as he
does include minimal information about it in another of his works on the Civil Rights
Movement, Inside Agitators: White Southerners in the Civil Rights Movement.39 As the
title denotes, in this work Chappell directed his attention to the white southerners
who aided the Civil Rights Movement, whom prior to Inside Agitators were often
mentioned but their general presence never examined. What did it mean for a white
man or woman to aid African Americans in a racially stratified society? This is the
question at the heart of Chappell’s work and he does provide some insight into the
Montgomery Bus Boycott, particularly focusing on the Durr and Graetz families,
whites who drove and aided the carpool and boycott. Chappell largely ignores the
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38 David Chappell, A Stone of Hope: Prophetic Religion and the Death of Jim Crow (Chapel Hill:
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carpool, as the goal of his historical work was to examine white individuals leading
the boycott, rather than looking at the masses who kept the boycott going.
Another monograph published in 2006 by Mary Stanton, The Hand of Esau:
Montgomery’s Jewish Community and the Bus Boycott, vowed in the prologue to
examine the Jewish communities reaction to the boycott, however it instead
provided a narrative documentary history of the boycott, with no attention paid to
the carpool, and offered virtually no analysis of the boycott itself.40 While this work
provides important sources to understanding the diverse makeup of Montgomery in
the 1950s and may spur historians to look deeper into Jewish involvement in the
Civil Rights Movement, The Hand of Esau it is not significantly helpful to the
historiography of the bus boycott.41
African American exploitation of the technological system of the automobile
changed the landscape of transportation. African American pooling of resources of
automobility to fight for equal rights bore significant consequences that reach into
the present and demand further analysis from historians. This study is a part of that
story, and seeks to explain how African Americans throughout the 20th century
applied long-held pooling skills to automotion, both in jitney buses and cars, in an
effort to shake free the binds of white supremacy.
Mary Stanton, The Hand of Esau: Montgomery’s Jewish Community and the Bus Boycott
(Montgomery: River Publishing, 2006.)
41 Another peculiar book on the boycott focused solely on “God’s” role in the boycott. Let My People
Go!: The Miracle of the Montgomery Bus Boycott by Robert J. Walker, examines the role of the divine in
the success of the boycott. The book’s jacket proclaims the work to be, “historically based, but mostly
inspirational…” and throughout the book Walker gives “God” the role of an “outside agitator” actively
working through individuals to shape the boycott. Walker does acknowledge mortal actors in the
boycott but does not provide a nuanced, secular analysis of the pivotal event. While one should not
look to this book for historical information or analysis, it does provide some very useful footnotes,
however one should be careful to check the reliability of some sources used.
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Chapter One: Jitney Buses and African American Desires for Alternative Public
Transportation
The creation of a streetcar transportation system was not a benign addition
to the urban landscape. As with any technology people quickly applied engrained
values and hierarchies to them. America’s racial hierarchy became inseparable from
streetcars, and segregation soon regulated that social space. Many African
Americans immediately rejected the idea of segregation laws and looked for ways to
challenge the white dominated power hierarchy. The most prominent of these
challenges came during the early 1900s in the form of black owned, operated, and
patronized transportation systems that revolved around one piece of technology:
the jitney bus. Jitney buses were automobiles outfitted to fit more people that the
car they are built upon was originally designed to carry. Jitneys got their name from
the nickel the operator typically charged as a passengers fare. Five cents was
colloquially referred to as a jitney and thus the jitney bus got its name. These buses
typically sat at least eight people and had space on the outside of the cab to hold on
to so that more passengers could be accommodated and allowed passengers to
break free from the streetcars without purchasing their own automobiles. The
automobile, modified into a jitney, was the premiere tool used by African Americans
to gain power in a system that largely left them powerless.42

There have been several historical studies of jitney buses, specifically August Meier and Elliott
Rudwick’s, "The Boycott Movement against Jim Crow Streetcars in the South, 1900-1906" The Journal
of American History 55 no.4 (March, 1969): 756-775; Ross D. Eckert and George W. Hilton “The
Jitneys,” Journal of Law and Economics 15, no. 2 (October 1972): 293-325, www.jstor.org (accesses
November 29, 2014); Blaine A. Brownell’s, “A Symbol of Modernity: Attitudes toward the Automobile
in Southern Cities in the 1920s," American Quarterly 24 no. 1 (March 1972):20-44; and Julian C.
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By the 1900s jitneys were a major factor in public transportation with one
North Carolinian city being home to over twenty-two black owned jitney companies
employing a total of thirty-five jitneys, all within the confines of a fairly small city. 43
Jitneys became the most promising means of challenging streetcar segregation for
African Americans however white legislators brought their own challenges to the
rise in jitneys, and a fluid tug of war for power over public transportation space
ensued.
Streetcars were not initially segregated. While there may have been
segregation in practice, such was unlikely or at least uncommon as indicated by the
initial resistance with which segregation laws were met. African Americans along
with the streetcar companies fought segregation laws, albeit each for very different
reasons. African Americans understood that separation from whites meant they
would not be guaranteed the same quality environment that whites enjoyed. This
was thoroughly apparent on train cars where black passengers were relegated to
the lowest class car, while economic class further divided acceptable social and
mental spaces for whites. Poor whites who could not afford first class tickets
inhabited the lower class coaches, often sharing those social spaces with African

Georgia Historical Quarterly 92, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 486-506 www.jstor.org (accessed November 29,
2014) All of these historical works pushed jitneys into the conversation, but did not fully examine the
power dynamics that arose out of the jitney operations. Historians have covered segregated
streetcars for some time, the most recent and most relevant to this study being Blair Murphy Kelly,
Right to Ride: Streetcar Boycotts and African American Citizenship in the Era of Plessy V. Ferguson
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010) in which Kelly maps the various boycotts that
took place challenging streetcar segregation but oddly only makes passing reference to substitutes to
the streetcars once in regards to taxi cabs (jitneys) in Richmond, Virginia (151)
43 For more on this particular community in Winston-Salem see Bertha Miller Hampton, “Blacks in
Winston-Salem, North Carolina 1895-1920: Community Development in an Era of Benevolent
Paternalism” (PhD diss., Duke University, 1981), 246.
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Americans. African Americans knew they would loose out in a legally segregated
system.44
The majority of streetcar company owners resisted segregation as being
economically nonsensical. Costs were at the heart of these businessmen’s distaste
for segregation laws as there was no clear model to use in the implementation of
such laws, and every option required increased spending, decreased revenue, or
both. As one newspaper explained the arguments against segregation laws on
streetcars were, “chiefly based on considerations of expediency and business.45
Owners felt that segregation laws resulted in decreased black patronage, especially
where other transportation options existed, and therefore decreased profits.46
Separate cars could be bought to carry black passengers, but that solution required
the increased spending on the car itself as well as the regular maintenance costs for
the extra streetcar. Streetcar owners did not see it as cost effective to have entirely
separate cars for white and black passengers. The most pragmatic solution was to
create separate sections of the streetcars, one for black passengers and one for
whites. This however would require enforcement of the rules, which also did not
come free. However, despite initial resistance on the part of streetcar owners, white
public opinion at times swayed these businessmen who then retracted their
previous contestations of segregation.47 Segregation within cars enabled companies
to conform to the desires of the law. The streetcar companies’ solution allowed the
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corporations a great deal of flexibility when it came to segregation as they could
adjust the number of spaces allocated for each race depending upon the demand at
any specific time, day, or route. The result was a system in which African Americans
in many southern cities, could not avoid segregated aspects of society on a daily
basis, and were forced to have some amount of interaction with the hostile whites of
the community, or at least those who both rode, and operated the streetcars. African
Americans who could not opt out of streetcar transportation, therefore could not
opt of segregated social and physical spaces.
Once city councils and county supervisors began to follow the segregation
pattern set by state legislators on railroads, Jim Crow rapidly came to dominate
streetcar operation. As the South completed its nearly uniform segregation of
railcars, a wave of segregation laws swept through southern states, beginning with
Georgia in 1891.48 The earliest laws regarding segregated streetcars did not require
segregation in every detail, but rather “as much as practicable” leaving much of the
application of the laws up to the streetcar companies, judges, police officers, and
lawyers.49 This led to a fairly heterogeneous and inconsistent implementation of
actual segregation upon streetcars, leaving many whites unsatisfied. What followed
was a string of laws passed at the city and county level that sought to supplement
the state segregation laws, making segregation a requirement for streetcars
throughout the South.50
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An important note here is that segregation laws pertaining to other social
spaces existed previously, but did not specifically involve local transportation,
however transportation the first space that segregation laws were challenged.51
Segregation on a transportation level, for African Americans, was something
different. A segregated pool or theatre did not require African Americans to interact
with whites, and they largely could avoid hostile whites in these physical spaces.
Unlike swimming pools and water fountains, streetcars were not constructed and
owned by the city or state. They were instead the property of private corporations,
which held profit as a major factor in decision-making. Separate facilities were
constructed or separate days and times established for African Americans and
whites to use a recreational facility. Thus a black swimmer would likely never
engage a white person in a pool. Furthermore, segregated recreational facilities
typically involved activities that African Americans could opt-out of in general.52
There is nothing of necessity involved with a segregated swimming pool, nor a
movie theatre. Most African Americans did not rely upon any of these facilities to
maintain a job, buy groceries, or carry out any of the typical daily chores that were
required of them. Recreation was not a requirement. The same could not be said for
transportation.53

While trains were some of the first physical spaces that came under the authority of legalized
segregation, they likely were not social spaces that the majority of Americans both white and black
experienced on a daily basis.
52 Jeff Wiltse, Contested Waters: A Social History of Swimming Pools in America (Chapel Hill:
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53 Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life After Reconstruction (New York: Oxford
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Historian Edward L. Ayers takes a similar view on segregated transportation
in the form of the railroads. Ayers explains that African Americans often preferred
to use black run businesses in order to avoid the exclusion faced in and on white
owned businesses, however both races could not avoid the use of railroads which
did not have separate trains entirely and thus set about creating the first shared
segregated space.54 The biggest difference between the trains and the streetcars was
that trains easily adopted separate coaches while streetcars almost unanimously
relied on imaginary lines drawn in an shared open air space. Regardless of this
difference, the framework Ayers placed on transportation via rail fits with
transportation via streetcar, or bus for that matter.
Unlike recreational facilities such as swimming pools, these streetcars were a
necessity. Because of entrenched racial economic inequalities very few African
Americans could afford the new automobiles being cranked out of factories. In fact
very few urban dwellers, black or white, owned cars in the early 1900s.55 They
turned instead to the streetcars as a means of getting back and forth to work, to
shops, and to see friends or families that were not within walking distance. 56 While
urban centers often give the impression that walking is a viable means of
transporting oneself, walking was often unreasonable for both African Americans
and whites. Urban sprawl and a lack of equal business representation extended the
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physical space that city dwellers needed to travel.57 By 1924, Atlanta which had a
bustling streetcar system, was roughly fifty square miles with the average streetcar
lines covering approximately four miles of distance.58 This was too far to reasonably
walk, especially if one was carrying anything. People did not always have to get
themselves all the way across town, but even going from just outside the heart of the
urban center into Atlanta’s downtown was a distance of more than three miles.
Streetcars were essential to urban travel.59
On the streetcars, if a driver was not content with the behavior of an African
American passenger, or simply desired to lord power over an unsuspecting black
individual, he or she could demand the passenger leave the streetcar, alert the
authorities, contrive an offense, or at times physically beat a passenger with
unsurprisingly no legal ramification. These drivers benefitted from the system of
white supremacy. While the regularity of physical abuse on the streetcars may not
be determined, in Atlanta in 1921 the regularity of abuse in general can be inferred
from an interracial meeting held in which members of the African American
community called for white streetcar drivers who were “found guilty of brusque,
and unpolite treatment” to be dismissed at once.60 The problem of abuse on
streetcars was clearly severe enough that a meeting was called between leaders of

For a superb introduction on the history, effects, and causes for urban sprawl see Paul L. Knox and
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both the black and white community to solve the problem, and one of the main
discussion points addressed precisely that abuse.
The fact that African Americans had to demand that any abusive driver be
dismissed indicates that prior to this meeting, drivers harming black patrons
received little or no repercussions from the law or the streetcar company.
Furthermore, the inclusion of abuse amongst claims of brusque and “impolite”
behavior indicates that an actual physical assault could be as common as a rude
gesture. While assault was clearly against the law, little must have been done about
physical violence, because African Americans sought means of punishing these
drivers that did not involve the authorities: namely the firing of abusive drivers.
This can be explained either by the failure to arrest or prosecute those who
committed such acts, or by African American’s distrust in the legal system to
successfully prosecute such offenders. In either scenario, the law was not effectively
dealing with the African American abuse at the hands of streetcar drivers. The fact
that this meeting made it into the news was a further indication of the severity and
regularity of abuse on segregated streetcars. Whether anyone of the Atlanta
Independent’s subscribers ever read this article is not anything that historians can
ever hope to prove, but this is also of little importance. The editor of the Atlanta
Independent and the author of the article saw the problem important enough to
publish in the newspaper indicating that abuse was not a fringe occurrence. The
article does not ever mention one incident in particular. Had abuse at the hands of a
streetcar operator been a singular event, it is highly likely that a singular event
would have been specifically mentioned, but the absence of any mention of this type
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of individual occurrence illustrates the commonality of the abuses and
mistreatments.61
The most permanent of structures on segregated streetcars (and the one
most clearly translated onto buses later) were signs denoting the African American
seating sections from the white ones. As streetcar companies sought to increase
revenue by decreasing overhead, they converted many traditionally two-coach large
streetcar lines that required two operators, to smaller “one-man” cars that as their
name denotes, only required one operator. This smaller space, when coupled with
only one entrance and exit door created racial space anxiety amongst whites who
were accustomed to and vocally in favor of as little interaction with African
Americans as possible within public transportation spaces. While streetcar
companies were unwilling to convert back to two coach cars, they were willing to
install signs that marked black and white sections of the car.62 African Americans
would be seated in the back, with whites located at the front, and the signs were
permanent visual reminders of Jim Crow and the second-class status of African
Americans. In other instances the anxiety of shared space between African
Americans and whites was alleviated through the increase in cars that serviced
predominately black sections of the city. In this practice, “White people then finding
a car full of blacks, understand that there will be another car very shortly which will
not be thus loaded. There is however no law or rule to prevent a white person from
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getting onto a car full of negroes if he wants to do so…” 63 Streetcar companies
accommodated white desires and assuaged white anxieties, but had no concern for
the welfare or desires of African Americans. Furthermore the law banned African
Americans from entering white allocated spaces, while whites were permitted to
enter black dominated spaces per their pleasure. African Americans were clearly
second-class citizens in the minds of streetcar company owners, and while these
owners accommodated whites, they seemed to “put up with” black patrons. Black
passengers were moved to the back of the streetcar or limited to certain cars as if
they were a part of the coach itself; furniture that could be moved about without
question or placed in separate coaches without any consultation. However, African
Americans would not sit as idle furniture, instead they organized their own means
of public transportation, or took advantage of other options.
African Americans across the country almost immediately resisted
segregated streetcars. They opposed segregation laws through political action, mass
meetings, and more commonly, boycotts.64 While black community leaders called
for boycotts, they did not suggest an alternate form of public transportation, largely
due to the lack of viable options. Ida B. Wells was one of the first African Americans
to suggest boycotts as a means of resistance. In 1892, before the dawn of the
automobile age, Wells called for a boycott of Memphis streetcars in retaliation to the
“Segregation with Safety Cars: Race Separation Not Found Difficult in Raleigh—Some Cars are
Short-Routed” Electrical Railway Journal 54, no. 19 (1919), 877.
64 Whites did not as a whole publicly demonstrate racist or bigoted sentiments toward African
Americans, nor did the most vocal African Americans identify segregation as coming from the white
community as a whole, rather, as Meier and Rudwick demonstrate, African Americans understood
there to be a connection between the hostile wing of white America and segregation. African
Americans were by no means seeking to not interact with whites entirely, however many
unsurprisingly did hope to avoid those who were hostile to other races.
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extensive lynchings that took place in Memphis earlier that year.65 Segregation on
streetcars was not inherently tied to lynching, yet Wells viewed the two as being
connected. For Wells, segregation was not the object she wished to fight against but
rather white supremacy in general. Wells saw the entire system of white supremacy
as connecting all that were complicit in the hierarchical structure, and therefore it
made sense for her to call for a boycott of the segregated streetcars. Along with the
boycott Wells encouraged African Americans living in Memphis to abandon the city
and move elsewhere. This was met with decent success as an estimated 4,000
African Americans left the city.66 The abandonment of the city was more viable for
the Memphis black community than the boycott, which faded as no other means of
transportation was established to replace the streetcars, and the 1896 Plessy v.
Ferguson decision gave the Supreme Court’s nod to segregated transportation.67
In 1905 one group of black ministers in Jacksonville, Florida called for the
community to boycott the streetcars, “in order to retain our self respect…Don’t be
Jim Crowed, Walk!”68 This urge to walk came largely because of the lack of a
successful jitney program within Jacksonville. Black jitney companies and
cooperatives were not found in every city in the United States however, in those that
did exist, jitneys would be the predominant tool for resistance to Jim Crow
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transportation and at times worked in tandem with streetcar boycotts.69 Again in
1905, in Nashville, Tennessee, a streetcar boycott was organized to fight
segregation. The boycotters first organized a horse drawn carriage as an alternative
to the streetcars but the system was not sufficient as the number of black patrons
overwhelmed the slow carriages. The boycotters organized into a company and sold
stock as a means of raising funds. By September they raised over $7,000 and
purchased electric buses to replace the carriages. Initially these buses, which carried
fifteen passengers at a time, were a major success. However, as patronage increased
the buses were met with major issues. The buses’ electric motors were not powerful
enough to take full loads of passengers up and down the steep Nashville hills. While
efforts were made to increase their power, the measures were not enough and
further battery problems caused frustrated black passengers return to the
streetcars by winter.70
While these electric buses did not create a long-term replacement to the
streetcars, they did successfully extend the boycott months past the failing use of
horse drawn carriages. The buses served as a social and mental space where African
Americans avoided whites, and avoided the degrading social space of the streetcars.
Electric buses were just not reliable enough, did not recharge quickly enough, and
were not powerful enough to meet the demands of traffic and terrain.
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Gas powered jitneys on the other hand would suit those needs perfectly.
Black Passengers could be dropped off all across cities, without being subject to
racist abuse, or the mere degradation of streetcar segregation that one black
reverend and community leader described as “unjust, barbaric…and cowardly.”71
The jitneys, unconfined to any preset or pre-established route, could drop
passengers off at specific locations, rather than waiting for a stop that is nearest
their actual destination. Not all jitneys were black owned and operated though. The
jitneys were also a successful means for challenging corrupt streetcar companies
and were used to do just so. The jitneys African Americans did frequent were
predominately operated by African American drivers and owned by African
American businessmen. This was immensely important, as passengers were not
subjected to the abuse that they could find themselves subject to on the segregated
streetcars.72
The most permanent of structures on segregated streetcars (and the one
most clearly translated onto buses later) were signs denoting the African American
seating sections from the white ones. As streetcar companies sought to increase
revenue by decreasing overhead, they converted many traditionally two-coach large
streetcar lines that required two operator, to smaller “one-man” cars that as their
name denotes, only required one operator. This smaller space, when coupled with
only one entrance and exit door created racial space anxiety amongst whites who
were accustomed to and vocally in favor of as little interaction with African
Savannah Morning News, July 10, 1902, Sept. 12, 13, 1906 http://infoweb.newsbank.com/
(accessed November 25, 2014).
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Americans as possible on spaces of public transportation. While streetcar
companies were unwilling to convert back to two coach cars, they were willing to
install signs that marked black and white sections of the car.73 African Americans
would be seated in the back, with whites located at the front, and the signs were
permanent visual reminders of Jim Crow and the second-class status of African
Americans. In other instances the anxiety of shared space between African
Americans and whites was alleviated through the increase in cars that serviced
predominately black sections of the city. In this practice, “White people then finding
a car full of blacks, understand that there will be another car very shortly which will
not be thus loaded. There is however no law or rule to prevent a white person from
getting onto a car full of negroes if he wants to do so…” 74 Streetcar companies
accommodated white desires and assuaged white anxieties, but had no concern for
the welfare or desires of African Americans. Furthermore the law banned African
Americans from entering white allocated spaces, while whites were permitted to
enter black dominated spaces per their pleasure. African Americans were clearly
second-class citizens in the minds of streetcar company owners, and while these
owners accommodated whites, they seemed to “put up with” black patrons. Black
passengers were moved to the back of the streetcar or limited to certain cars as if
they were a part of the coach itself; furniture that could be moved about without
question or placed in separate coaches without any consultation. However, African
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Americans would not sit as idle furniture, instead they organized their own means
of public transportation, or took advantage of other options.
By the 1920s black-owned jitneys provided new mobility, and new power to
African Americans tired of degrading streetcar policies and practices. In Atlanta,
another topic on the agenda at this meeting was the creation of, “an exclusive bus
line operated by colored capitalists.”75 The term bus line here can be read as “jitney
service” for African American bus lines at this period bore no distinct difference
between the services jitneys provided.76 Atlanta’s African American community
demonstrated their clear desire to remove themselves from institutions of
segregation where possible. African Americans saw the mere existence of legal
segregation as demeaning. As August Meir and Elliot Redwick point out, “protests
through mass meetings, petitions to city councils and legislatures, and even an
occasional boycott, often began while the segregation bills were being
considered.”77 While the community leaders at this meeting demanded that abusive
drivers be dismissed from their jobs, they also likely did not trust that this demand
would be met, or at least did not see segregated streetcars even with polite drivers
as the best form of transportation they could utilize.
There existed a seeming irony of segregation within this community. While
meeting in an “inter-racial” group, seeking to rectify injustices of the segregated
system, these African Americans were not trying to topple the system of
segregation, but rather remove themselves from physical spaces in which white
“Inter-Racial Meeting at Allen Temple a Success,” Atlanta Independent
Blaine A. Brownell, “A Symbol of Modernity: Attitudes toward the Automobile in Southern Cities in
the 1920s," American Quarterly 24, (March 1972): 20, www.jstor.org (accessed November 29, 2014).
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dominated social systems dictated the terms of segregation. They clearly stated the
desire for an “exclusive” form of transportation. These African Americans used the
word exclusive to design a system that, like streetcar segregation, was to be based
upon skin color. The difference between this system and that of the streetcars was
that there was actually further separation between African Americans and whites.
Rather than share a streetcar in which seating would be separated, the African
Americans of this community, and every community that utilized black owned jitney
companies, decided that if segregation was to be enforced they wanted it on their
own terms. The establishment of an entirely separate transportation line was far
more segregated that that of the streetcars, but it was segregation on African
American terms or rather African Americans dictated the rules to be enacted in the
space of the jitneys. This marks a difference that African Americans drew between
Jim Crow segregation and the separation of races. The point brought up at the
Atlanta meeting was that if possible, African Americans should, “Buy a car of your
own and escape Jim-Crowism from street car service.”78 Separation from whites did
not in this case mean the same thing as Jim Crow segregation, as long as it was
separation at the hands and under the power of African Americans. While it may
have been ideal for African Americans to purchase their own cars, the majority were
not in the financial situation to be able to make such a purchase. If African
Americans opted out of the segregated streetcars, they voluntarily removed
themselves further from spaces where whites maintained authority. Jim Crow
segregation meant that whites told African Americans where they could and could
78
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not be; it meant that whites allowed African Americans into white spaces. Whites
were rarely if ever fined, arrested, or prosecuted for using “colored” facilities.79 This
was because in Jim Crow America whites were superior; whites held authority, and
whites controlled space. This is why the “exclusivity” of the black line that was being
proposed was so powerful. This would have been an instance in which African
Americans controlled the space of the bus or jitney; in which African Americans
could tell whites that they were not welcome. As jitneys or privately owned cars,
automobility injected new power-granting resources into established racial
transportation structures. This power of black exclusivity threatened white
supremacy. This threat was one that those who sought to maintain white supremacy
reacted against. Whites drew up legislation to drive the jitneys off the roads.
While jitney buses allowed African Americans to claim authority over their
own transportation systems, it is very unlikely that whites would ever have tried to
use these separate systems. However, white supremacists did not react to the
jitneys because they desired to actually use any black owned and operated system,
but rather they reacted because the jitneys were taking power and authority out of
the hands of white supremacists. The very idea that an African American could deny
admission to a white citizen, could tell a white citizen that they were not allowed
into a particular space, and could escape the system in which whites controlled the
authority for delineating acceptable spaces for races was unacceptable to white
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supremacists. White supremacists operated under the notion that they could never
give up power, as in the minds of many white supremacists, the relinquishing of
even some power threatened white supremacy as a whole.80 Under the guise of
public safety, those who desired to maintain Jim Crow America largely expunged the
jitneys, which up to their prohibition in the 1920s were the most successful tool
African Americans had in the fight against segregation. These laws, enacted
throughout the South as well as western states such as California, never directly
engaged or acknowledged the fact that African Americans, for a time, stole away a
portion of power typically reserved for whites, and it was this near loss of power
that most threatened the entire body of segregation politics.
Following the advent of the jitneys the first decade of the 1900s saw massive
opposition from streetcar companies, legislators, white supremacists, and a host of
others who desired to maintain the streetcar systems. The legislation that arose to
do away with the jitneys has been effectively documented by historians Ross D.
Eckert and George W. Hilton. Rather than focus on race, Eckert and Hilton viewed
the legislation through an economic lens, highlighting how loss of revenue from the
streetcar companies was a strong motivator in outlawing the jitneys.81 Money most
certainly played a major role in legislation aimed against jitneys and while it is clear
that race was not the only factor at play when jitneys were virtually outlawed, white
supremacists most certainly reacted to the threat the jitneys posed by embracing
Neil R. McMillen, Dark Journey: Black Mississippians in the Age of Jim Crow (Chicago: University of
Illinois Press, 1989), 56. Dark Journey gives the historiography yet another look at the ways that
African Americans navigated jim crow, focusing on day-to-day happenings as well as resistance to the
racist systemized segregation of Mississippi during the early 1900s.
81 Ross D. Eckert and George W. Hilton “The Jitneys,” Journal of Law and Economics 15, no. 2 (October
1972): 293-325, www.jstor.org (accesses November 29, 2014).
80

41
the economic argument as well. White supremacists, streetcar corporations, and
those that held streetcar stock shared a common desire to do away with the jitneys.
African American jitney companies faced the same threats and were done away with
through the same means as other jitney systems. Economic were a powerful
motivating force against the jitneys, but race also played a significant part in
specifically targeting black jitney systems.82
Segregation legislation continued to be a major tool in regulating the jitneys
as white authority sought to recuperate the power being taken by African American
jitney companies. A 1915 Houston a law created segregation among all jitneys
within the city.83 By introducing segregation to the jitney buses the city officials
established regulations that took authority from the jitney owners. Previously,
jitney owners dictated appropriate space within the cabs of the jitneys, providing
African Americans jitney owners the rare and powerful ability to exclude whites.
Even if this power was never exercised the ability for African Americans to relegate
appropriate space based on race or any other means was unacceptable to those
benefiting from white supremacy.
The anonymous author of “Jitney Bus Wins Favor Quickly” in conjunction
with the Houston ordinance identified other regulations that included surety bonds,
patron regulations and regulations aimed at stratifying and cementing routes that
jitneys could run.84 These were all forms of regulation that targeted jitneys, and
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while racial motivations certainly contributed to the addition of such regulations it
was not the sole motivating factor.
In Jacksonville, Florida in 1917, race was however at the forefront of
increased regulations made on Jitney buses. Legislators drafted a law demanding
that jitneys stop for any person regardless of race.85 At face value this seems to be a
challenge to segregation, however one must take into account the context within
which this law was created. Jacksonville had several jitney systems, one of which
was a successful black owned and operated system. The law was supported by
members of the Georgia Railway and Power Company (GRPC), a Georgian company
that supported and advocated for streetcars and actively campaigned to outlaw and
regulate jitney buses.86 The law in Jacksonville did not exist within a vacuum and
caught the attention of some outside of Florida. At a meeting called four years later
by the GRPC members of the group identified that a major reason for the success of
jitney buses in Jacksonville, and across the country was in part the regular use of
black owned jitney buses by black communities in various cities. The GPRC correctly
identified that the exclusive jitney service African Americans enjoyed in Jacksonville
was a successful means of not only avoiding the Jim Crow streetcars, but also
creating a successful, competitive, black owned company. The black owned jitneys
of Jacksonville were operating at strength for several years, and were not showing
signs of failure while simultaneously refusing to pick up white passengers,
maintaining a technically segregated space without making African Americans
Charter and Ordinances of the City of Jacksonville (1917), sec. 591.
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second-class citizens.87 By forcing the jitney buses to pick up passengers of any race,
the power of exclusivity and the delegation of space that black owned jitney bus
operators enjoyed was done away with. These jitneys that previously serviced only
black passengers, now would have to meet the demands of white passengers as well.
Furthermore the jitneys would have to create segregated seating since they were
required to service both black, and white passengers. This law allowed power to be
placed back into the hands of Jacksonville police, who could in theory enforce the
law upon African American jitney operators, while allowing white jitney operators
to continue to pick up only white passengers.88 Thus white control of the law
trumped the temporary power granted by automobile technological resources.
What is important here is that the power that was gained by black jitney owners
was lost through the establishment of this law, and furthermore, that power was
again placed back into the hands of authorities. While jitneys, which became
desegregated, would vanish from Jacksonville, no law would end segregation on the
streetcars or buses that grew out of streetcar operations until the 1960s.89
The GPRC’s attention to the Jacksonville law was a rare case. It is the only
instance yet to be found in which the GRPC supported laws requiring businesses to
service both races. It does not seem that the GPRC ever challenged some of the cabs
Chambliss, “A question of Progress and Welfare: The Jitney Bus Phenomenon in Atlanta: 19151925,” 499.
88 While there is no evidence that can speak to any form of application of this law, Chambliss
demonstrates that following the law and others that regulated jitney buses and placed fees and
surety bonds upon jitneys, the black owned jitneys and jitneys in general were regulated out of
existence.
89 Abel A. Bartley, Keeping the Faith: Race, Politics, and Social Development in Jacksonville, Florida
1940-1970 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 79. This work while primarily dealing with
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and jitneys that refused to service black patrons. The GPRC would simultaneously
champion for increased regulation of all sorts, including but not limited to streetcars
and jitneys.90
While there were numerous motivations that brought forth jitney regulation,
the excuse given was one which conflated racial and commercial motivations: public
safety. In the same New York Times article that listed the 1915 Houston Law
numerous other laws were identified all of which connected in some way to the idea
of public safety. Ordnances on segregation were justified through ideas that, “the
mixing of races is seen to be dangerous for all involved” with special attention paid
to “a large number of complaints received from young girls.” 91 White anxiety
regarding African American men among young girls while not new, was still
effective in helping to pass the segregation regulations and restrictions on routes.
The article explains the ramification of one popular regulation that limited the
routes of jitneys stating the regulation would, “put them (the jitneys) in a different
category from that in which they began. The earliest jitneys bore the slogan, ‘Take
you anywhere for a jitney’; meaning that the limitations of rails and franchises were
to be abolished…”92 The lack of free mobility of the jitney would take away one of
the key technical features that made it such a success. It would do away with the
freedom of movement that jitney operators and passengers enjoyed, and force jitney
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drivers into a rigid route. Segregation, fixed routes, extensive licensure and a volley
of other regulations largely brought an end to the jitneys.93
One company however prevailed. The Safe Bus Co. out of Winston-Salem,
North Carolina is the sole shining success story of the jitney age. Jitneys emerged as
a popular form of transportation for the black community of Winston-Salem, not
only because of the segregation implemented on the streetcars of the city, but also
due to the simple fact that streetcars largely did not run within the black
community. The jitneys of the North Carolina city, like other urban cities across the
country, experienced immense success.94 Numerous black owned jitney services
arose and provided the black citizens of Winston-Salem with a means of
transportation that avoided segregation, economically empowered the community,
and perhaps most important, gave them an exclusive space of control. The Safe Bus
Co. was actually created out of increased regulations on numerous Winston-Salem
jitney services. These regulations threatened the continuance of any and all jitneys
in Winston-Salem. This call for regulation was again came with the excuse of “public
safety.”95 By 1926, the Winston-Salem jitneys faced similar regulations that others
came under, but instead of folding due to the financial pressures that increased
regulation brought, the numerous Winston Salem jitney operations banded together
and incorporated.96
By 1926 the city was home to, “22 Negroes operating 35 jitneys…” a number
that provided strength to the cause of African American transportation in Winston
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Salem.97 The owners of these jitney operations raised the money necessary to pay
incorporation fees and in 1926, “organized at a $100,000 capitalization.”98 The
ability to overcome the regulations often designed to cripple the jitney companies
speaks to the economic power that could be generated through black transportation
culture. The economic success of the Winston-Salem jitneys is what provided the
means to successfully organize and incorporate, and this success would follow the
company out of the jitney period and into that of the bus line.99
The Safe Bus Co. is a singular instance of sustained success of the jitney
service, bears a significant place in the history of African American utilization of the
jitney bus, and stands as a lasting example of the success of black business in an era
in which black businesses captured power that previously was denied. The ability of
Winston Salem’s jitney operators to rapidly organize and incorporate helped them
maintain at least some of that new power, despite white control of the regulatory
process. These jitney owners maintained power through black mobility achieved
from the technological resource of automobiles. It also is a prime example of the
methods and strengths that came emerge out of black exclusivity, black economic
power, and black organization all of which were key to later successful instances of
resistance to Jim Crow.
Streetcars largely never faced desegregation as they gave way to buses. The
replacing of one technological system with another led to the increased
implementation of bus lines, which offered many of the basic advantages enjoyed by
“Dixie Bus Company at a Crossroads” Ebony, December 1965, 74.
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both African American and white jitney passengers and operators. Buses, while tied
to a set route, could navigate through city blocks much more effectively than
streetcars. One route may take a bus onto more than a dozen streets and since they
were unconfined to the rails that streetcars relied upon, routes could be more
effectively set and changed as the market demanded. Buses replaced streetcars as
the preeminent mode of urban public transportation and in many cities, African
Americans became the primary patrons of the buses.
Alongside buses developed a rich and extensive black automobile economy
that mirrored national trends. Black motorists utilized copies of “The Negro
Motorist Green Book” to navigate while traveling finding within the pages lists of
restaurants, hotels, service stations and numerous other travel necessities welcome
to African Americans. African American service stations became hubs for black
motorists to fill their tanks as well as repair their cars. The mechanics that worked
on these cars developed a vast amount of knowledge while providing an essential
service to the black community in an environment that welcomed black customers,
rather than rejecting or abusing them.100 The black auto economy became one of the
backbones of black business as cars became available to more African Americans.
Although the jitney largely vanished from the streets of major cities, it served
as a prime example of the empowerment that could be grasped through the use of
the automobile, and African American communities would again look to the car as a
tool to fight white supremacy. The lasting legacy of the jitney bus should African

Kevin Borg, Auto Mechanics: Technology and Expertise in Twentieth Century America (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 5.
100

48
Americans’ ability exploitation of the jitney in navigate through segregation on their
own terms, temporarily claiming power through mobility and spatial authority.
Although regulation mostly restored white control over urban black mobility prior
to World War II, the automobile was again brought to the frontlines in the fight for
civil rights in the 1950s to help topple Jim Crow, and again empower black
communities through automobility.
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Chapter 2: Pooling: African Americans, Automobiles, and Black Organization
in the Montgomery Bus Boycott
It was a mild afternoon in Montgomery the day the police arrested Claudette
Colvin.101 There was nothing abnormal about that day and there was little abnormal
about her. Her mother was a maid and her father a day laborer, both with little
education.102 This was more than common it was the experience of the majority of
Montgomery’s black citizens.103 Nonetheless, despite her normality she fought the
status quo. She sat on the Montgomery City Bus Lines’ bus refusing the bus driver’s
demands for her to move further back, and that refusal carried consequences. Bus
drivers in Montgomery held “the powers of a police officer of the city while in actual
charge of the bus” and any refusal to obey the driver’s commands was dealt with
sternly.104 The actual police were then called but she refused to obey them as well.
The police manhandled her, dragged her off the bus, and threw her in the back seat
of the patrol car. Even in her arrest she fought the authority of segregation, “kicking
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and clawing” as the white officers placed her in custody.105 Claudette Colvin was
only fifteen when she challenged bus segregation in 1955 Montgomery.106
The rules that governed space on buses in the south followed those that
ruled over space on streetcars holding strong as Jim Crow laws remained and in
some spaces expanded. 107 Still though, public transportation was one of the
predominant spaces for black and white interactions as just on the streetcars, all
passengers on the buses sat within the close proximity of each other confined to the
fairly small space of public buses. It made sense then that it was there that the rules
that governed pace would be contested. Like the African Americans jitney
passengers and operators before them, the black citizens of Montgomery Alabama
looked to the automobile as a means toward freedom, however unlike in the early
1900’s, the car would not be used to avoid segregation laws, it would instead be
used to challenge them as Montgomery’s black community rallied a massive carpool
system that consisted of over 300 individual cars operated by hundreds of drivers
and servicing thousands of passengers. This was no small undertaking and the
carpool bore significant ramifications for Montgomery’s citizens, and for Americans
across the country changing the way that African Americans communities, and
authorities that police them interact with the automobile.
“Segregation Case Reset for March 18th” Montgomery Advertiser, March 10th, 1955
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Buses were vitally important to Montgomery’s African American Community
in 1955. Historian Steven A. Reich contends that African Americans’ “fight for
citizenship—for basic social recognition—was thus intimately connected to African
Americans’ workplace experiences.”108 Reich emphasizes the fact that, as Martin
Luther King explained it, African Americans were, “a working people.” If African
Americans were in fact “a working people” then buses were the way many got to
work in the 1950s. Work was certainly a major part of African American life in
Montgomery and a large reason why black bus riders rarely challenge segregation in
those spaces. They could not afford a loss of their service.109
Colvin’s arrest illustrated the polarization of Montgomery’s community
across lines of race. Whites saw the arrest as just one witness of the event, a white
woman named Cameron Collins, expressed her respect for the officers involved
noting in a letter to the local newspaper, “they [the police officers] used only the
amount of force necessary and then only when sorely provoked.”110 These were not
the same sentiments held by Colvin who described being “dragged from the bus.”111
It is unlikely that Colvin, a fifteen-year-old girl weighing 115 pounds could give two
grown police officers much difficulty that would as Collins described, provoke the
officers to use any amount of force.112 One may never know just how abusive or
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composed the officers were, nonetheless the arrest made waves among the black
citizens of Montgomery and was one of the real beginnings of pooling resources for
the bus boycott that came months later. Edgar Daniel Nixon, a public leader among
the black community, met with the Women’s Political Council (WPC), various
religious leaders of Montgomery’s black churches, the local chapter of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and Clifford Durr, a
white lawyer who made his reputation defending the civil rights of those in need of
legal defense.113 This was a powerful group of activists.114 The WPC was started by
Jo Ann Robinson as a reaction to segregation a decade prior to Colvin’s arrest. In
1946 Robinson organized the women of Montgomery, establishing the WPC with a
goal to have members in every important branch of socio-political structure in the
city.115 The WPC remained active and organized, reaching over 300 members by
1955. Their three chapters met regularly, discussing issues that Montgomery’s
African American community faced, and were prepared to mobilize as soon as
Robinson gave the call. As Robinson herself put it, “Wherever there were more than
10 blacks employed we had a member there and we were organized to the point
that we knew that in a matter of hours we could corral the whole city.”116
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Like Robinson and the WPC, the religious leaders of Montgomery provided
an avenue for Nixon and other black leaders to reach the larger black community.
African Americans used churches as venues for religious and political discussion for
decades, and Montgomery’s black churches in 1955 were no different. Black
churches were spaces over which whites bore little to no authority and from which
they were almost entirely absent.117 This absence meant that African Americans
could discuss common issues they faced as second-class citizens in the largely white
dominated hierarchy of society. The spaces of black churches were venues that
allowed for organization, mobilization and dispersal of legal information provided
by the NAACP.118
Nixon served for five years on the executive board of the NAACP and knew
the benefit they would provide any mass action in Montgomery.119 For decades the
NAACP was at the forefront of legal change regarding African Americans, and in
1954 they experienced a major victory against segregation in the Brown V. Board of
Education overturning Plessy v. Ferguson ruled upon over half a decade earlier.
Although Brown V. Board found that separate was inherently unequal, the federal
ruling had not yet been implemented by authorities to challenge state power, let
alone any city power that Montgomery held. Nixon thought it was time that changed.
The lawyers of the NAACP knew the law. However, despite their legal prowess, the
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NAACP, “had never been able to organize a mass base.”120 Nixon was connecting
legal organizers with social ones. It was a brilliant move.
Nixon was experienced with pooling political and social resources as he was
president of the Alabama chapter of the brotherhood of the Sleeping Car Porters, an
organization run by Phillip A. Randolph, a man who himself fought for African
Americans’ rights, at one point calling in 1941 for a march on Washington to protest
racial discrimination in the wartime industrial production. A direct result of
Randolph’s black protests and organization was the executive order 8802 which
outlawed all racial discrimination in the federal defense industry. 121 This was the
man who Nixon looked up to, the man that helped shape Nixon’s political
understandings, and the man who in part inspired Nixon to organize for African
American civil liberties. Nixon knew what would be required for any hope of change
to Jim Crow, assembled the necessary collaborators, and they all set out to see what
could be done about buses in Montgomery, Alabama.
The group of activists closely examined Colvin’s case. They hoped Colvin’s
arrest, and Colvin herself would be ample reason for Montgomery’s black
community to rally support and make some kind of change, however what they
found was not what they were looking for. Colvin was a fifteen-year-old girl, still in
high school, and one thing that fifteen years olds often do is make mistakes. Colvin
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was an unmarried pregnant teenager with especially dark skin.122 Colvin herself
explained the significance of her skin tone saying light skin was the complexion,
“that most black people accept when they are with the middle class.”123 African
Americans were not an amorphous body of cohesion, and there were hierarchies
even within black communities. Light skin was a physical trait with complex social
ramifications that could benefit or hinder African Americans depending on the
circumstances.124 Even disregarding Colvin’s complexion the fact that she was a
teenager, and a pregnant one at that, did not make her an ideal candidate for a
public, moral cause. Nixon, the WPC and the NAACP agreed that Colvin would not be
made the “icon” of change in Montgomery.125 Mobilization for civil rights was put on
the backburner but plans for action did not fade away, and the resources remained
pooled and remained connected waiting for the time to spring into action: enter
Rosa Parks.
Rosa Parks repeated Colvin’s defiance and wouldn’t budge. On a cold
December 1st in 1955 the small 43-year-old secretary for the NAACP boarded the
Cleveland Avenue bus in Montgomery, Alabama, taking a seat in the last vacant
“black” spot. When a handful of white passengers boarded the bus, the driver
hollered for the African American riders seated in the middle of the bus to stand up.
One man and two women in the first of the “black rows” complied, while Parks did
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not budge an inch. The bus driver asked if she was going to give up her seat, only to
be met with a simple short answer of, “No I am not.” The driver then called the
police; two officers arrived, boarded the bus and asked Parks, “Why don’t you stand
up?” She answered the officers with a question of her own replying, “Why do you
push us around?” The officers waited a moment and one answered, “I do not know,
but the law is the law and you’re under arrest,” placed the Parks under arrest, and
took her to jail. Rosa Parks’ actions that day would almost immediately initiate the
Montgomery bus boycott.126
Rosa Parks was a woman trained in nonviolent civil disobedience, and while
December 1st was not planned to be a challenge to segregation, Parks knew
challenging the driver could potentially be the spark for which E.D. Nixon, the WPC,
the black ministers of Montgomery and the NAACP had prepared.127 Parks attended
the meetings months prior when Nixon gathered the groups together to discuss
Colvin’s case. She was a part of political action in Montgomery and had been for over
a decade. Parks joined the NAACP in 1943 and was elected secretary, and over a
decade later in the summer of 1955 attended a seminar in nonviolent civil
disobedience alongside other white and black civil rights supporters and activists.128
It was a trained, calculated mind geared toward nonviolent resistance, and civil
disobedience that Rosa Parks brought with her onto the bus that December day.
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After her arrest, Rosa Parks phoned Nixon, for whom she worked. Nixon
made his way down to the local jail, posted bail for Parks, and accompanied her
home.129 There the two discussed the situation with Parks’ family, and when Nixon
returned home he summed up the conclusion telling his wife, “Baby, we’re going to
boycott the Montgomery buses.”130 But, it was not as simple as just deciding not to
ride the buses. If the boycott was to be effective massive numbers of people needed
to join the movement, and with no other way to get to work, that was not a likely
case. All of the leadership Nixon gathered needed to pool and mobilize
Montgomery’s black population.
Jo Ann Robinson spearheaded the initial call to boycott and knew the WPC
were the most effective tool to do so. She was not overestimating the WPC’s
ability.131 Robinson wasted no time. As soon as she got news of Park’s arrest she set
the WPC network into motion. She called every member of the three WPC chapters,
disseminated directions of action and prepared for the call to boycott the buses. The
directions for the WPC primarily dealt with logistics regarding distribution of
leaflets that Jo Ann Robinson herself worked through the night printing and cutting
out. WPC members stood at school campuses and other public venues and received
the leaflets from Jo Ann Robinson, via her car. Robinson described the system
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explaining, “I ran of 35,000 copies…I took them in my car. The packages were
already there. It would take about a half minute to drive on the school campus, the
kid would be there, in a just a minute they would disappear.”132 In this way,
Robinson was able to rapidly distribute the 35,000 leaflets calling for a boycott of
the buses. Prior to even any organization of the carpool the car was filling a vital
role needed for the boycott. Using her car, Robinson could zip across the city and
onto the school campuses while carrying the boxes full of leaflets, hand them off to
members of the WPC and their supporters, and then quickly get to the next stop all
within the privacy of her car. This was important as time was a major factor in
rallying for the boycott, and the car directly provided rapid, independent mobility.
Robinson’s leaflets were quickly distributed among the black community.
The leaflets explained that another African American woman was arrested tying
Rosa Parks to Claudette Colvin, and set out the reasons that the black community
should boycott the buses. The leaflet stated, “Three-fourths of the riders are
Negroes, yet we are arrested or have to stand over empty seats. If we do not do
something about these arrests they will continue. The next time it may be you, or
your daughter, or mother.”133 Gender played a major role in the Montgomery bus
boycott. Robinson included the idea that a mother or daughter could be arrested
because she knew that the black community would sympathize with a female more
so than a male due to the innocence that was tied to femininity. Femininity could be
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an empowering factor in Montgomery in the 1950s as it both allowed women to
often be exempt from the most violent or forward acts of racism, and also meant
that there would be a stronger reaction from the black community should they fall
victim to pubic displays of racism at the hands of the white citizens of
Montgomery.134 Jo Ann Robinson explained that often, “black women and the white
man were the freest people in the southern states.” 135 This is clearly an
overestimation. Black women were not always exempt from the violence of racism
in the south, however the fact that Robinson even made this overestimation gives
credence to the idea that black women could move throughout Montgomery with
more ease that black men. This is the reason that the WPC was able to garner so
much support without disrupting the white supremacy hierarchy of Montgomery,
Alabama. Whites were less suspicious of black women, and their seeming innocence
meant they could in fact go against that innocence without being detected. However
the empowerment of femininity did have limitations.
Robinson initiated the boycott but could not see it through. She describes the
limitations of feminine empowerment stating that, “the Women’s Political Council
planned it [the boycott] for Monday only, and it was left up to the men to take over
after we had forced them to really decide whether or not it had been successful
enough to continue, and how long it was to be continued.”136 The black women of
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Montgomery forced the issue to the forefront of the discussion on racial politics, but
it was left up to the black male leaders to lead the way. While it was acceptable,
necessary even, for women to be active in the fight for civil rights, their gender
excluded them from leadership, or at least visible, public leadership. Jo Ann
Robinson, despite her gender, certainly remained a leader of the boycott, working in
tandem with black male authority figures throughout the struggle against the bus
lines and the city of Montgomery. Robinson rallied with Martin Luther King, E.D.
Nixon and other black ministers at the first mass meeting and set out plans for a
boycott.137
Through the leaflets Robinson urged the black community to stay off the
buses that Monday stating, “You can afford to stay out of school for one day if you
have no other way to go except by bus. You can also afford to stay out from town
one day.”138 This was true, the black community could afford one day of abstaining
from transportation. They may even be able to afford two, but eventually they
would have to go to school, go to town, and go to work. A seemingly obvious point,
that is often overlooked in the historical record, is that in this urban environment of
1955 Montgomery Alabama, some form of transportation other than walking was
essential to life in Montgomery, and an extended bus boycott impinged on that
necessity.
Nixon knew that they had their work cut out for them and the next morning
called various community religious leaders, among whom were both Reverend
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Ralph Abernathy, and Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. If the boycott was to survive
past that Monday, these religious leaders needed to establish a central
organizational body.139 The result was the Montgomery Improvement Association
(MIA), which elected Martin Luther King Jr. as its first president, and they
immediately began organizing the boycott.140 The MIA also that day drafted a letter
to be presented to city officials and the bus company demanding improvements in
the treatment of black passengers, but not calling for an end to segregation.141 Their
demands were not radical. While segregation was the heart of the problem on
Montgomery buses, it was not the central concern for all black leadership in the
December of 1955. The MIA was not demanding desegregation but rather for
courtesy from the bus drivers, a change to the seating policy that maintained
segregation but worked on a first-come first-served basis, and the employment of
African American drivers to service the predominately African American sections of
Montgomery.142 The omission of any reference to Jim Crow segregation in the letter
is telling. Their demands demonstrated the settled and largely uncontested nature
of segregation within Montgomery’s community in 1955. They threatened drastic
measures such as the boycotting of public transportation, but were not calling for
anything that would appear to be drastic requests. This could be seen as both
pragmatic and radical. The African American community in wanting their demands
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met, did not seek a sudden upheaval of white power and white authority. They
wanted instead slight changes to the existing system of segregation, and were
willing to work within Jim Crow to improve their lives. Segregation was in fact not
the focal concern of the MIA at the beginning of the boycott; abuse of black
passengers was. As the MIA explained, black passengers, “have, at various times,
been pushed around, embarrassed, threatened, intimidated and abused” by white
drivers.143 Violence often came indirectly as was the case with one African American
mother and passenger of the City Bus Lines would experience. According to the MIA:
One Negro mother, with two small children in her arm, put them on
the front seat while she opened her purse for her fare. The driver
ordered her to take the children from the seat, and without giving her
the chance to place the children elsewhere, lunged the vehicle
forward, causing the small children to be thrown into the aisle of the
bus.144
Stopping these abuses was more important to the MIA than challenging segregation
head on, and so they were willing to make demands for rules that would not
drastically change those in existence. The MIA demanded, “seating of Negro
passengers from rear to front, and white passengers from front to rear on ‘first-
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come-first-serve’ basis with no seats reserved for any race.”145 African Americans
would still be seated in the back of the bus and whites in the front. The only real
change would be that African Americans would not be asked to stand for whites,
something that was already supposed to be enforced by the current law. 146 The
MIA’s demands, while certainly pragmatic in their desire for actual and immediate
change, were certainly also radical. These demands were voiced by African
Americans, and called for a change in behavior from whites, specifically whites in
power positions, as well as demanding whites relinquish some of their authority
over space. This is the most radical of the demands made by the MIA. If drivers
could not demand that African American passengers stand for white ones, then
black passengers would have authority over the spaces in which they sat, and their
own bodies.
The impinging of movement and mobility was one of the major issued faced
by Montgomery’s black community, and whites were the ones with nearly full
authority over space, and the defining of acceptable movement through those
spaces. The space of the bus, like streetcars and railroads before, was legally
dominated by whites, who dictated where African Americans could reside as
passengers.147 This authority was supposed to have its limits. While Rosa Parks
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legally was within her right to refuse to move as she was sitting in a section that was
supposed to work under the first-come first-served rule, the fact that she was black
trumped the law.148 Within the domain of the bus, the bus driver held ultimate
authority, backed up by police if necessary.
While the MIA’s demands would not require much action from whites, they
could serve as a symbol of power. The MIA, a black organized and black operated
group sought to dictate to whites what behavior was appropriate. This was atypical.
Whites predominately wrote the laws, whites overwhelmingly held political office,
and whites made up the majority of law enforcement.149 The MIA’s letter was
assuredly radical for the time, and while it did not call for a permanent shift in any
of these power hierarchies, it did serve as a moment of empowerment for the black
community of Montgomery. Thus simultaneously radical and pragmatic their
demands spurred a movement that would not simply disappear when whites
refused.
The MIA’s lack of demanding desegregation held ramifications on a larger
scale. In fact segregation was a main point of contention between the MIA and the
NAACP in the early stages of the boycott. In a letter to William C. Patton, a field
secretary for the NAACP, Roy Wilkins, the recently appointed executive secretary of
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the NAACP, stated that, “Obviously when our national programs call for abolishing
segregation and our lawyers are fighting on that basis…we could not enter an
Alabama case asking merely for more polite segregation.”150 If the MIA wanted legal
and financial backing from the NAACP, they needed to push for complete
desegregation of the buses, a decision that was made much easier after Montgomery
officials refused the MIA’s initial demands. The MIA, WPC, NAACP and all other
members of the blossoming boycott would demand the desegregation of the
Montgomery’s buses.
The MIA, the WPC, and the NAACP were not content to simply make demands
of the bus lines and the city. They planned on backing them up too. They decided to
go about printing more leaflets, distributing them again around the community as a
means of organizing a mass protest and boycott of the buses.151 One line of the
leaflets printed again by Jo Ann Robinson read, “Don’t ride the buses to work, to
town, to school, or any where on Monday. If you work, take a cab, or share a ride, or
walk.”152 This line would come to sum up the three major forms of transportation
that would be used, and noted the leadership’s understanding that walking, while a
possibility for some, was not going to be viable for many in Montgomery’s black
community. Most African Americans could not walk to work, to school, or to do
errands. This led to the MIA’s organization of a complex and highly structured
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system centered around transportation, and more specifically, the automobile. They
started a carpool.
A common adage for judging the importance of one factor among many is to
“follow the money.” Over the year-long boycott the MIA money went to the carpool
more than any other budget item.153 The MIA spent $5,998.33 on gas, oil, tires and
tags, $4,537.03 on drivers and dispatchers, $733.73 on auto parts and repairs to
carpool vehicles, and $163 on fines and penalties all totaling in $11,432.09 spent on
the carpool. This was the budget for just one month.154 This total was $5,000 more
than any other sector of expenditures per month, marking the deep significance of
the carpool in the MIA’s eyes. They dedicated a majority of their resources to
keeping the carpool going because they knew it was the most important sustaining
the boycott. But how did this spending materialize on the ground for the carpoolers?
On January 24, 1956, eight weeks into the boycott, a Montgomery police
officer noted in a memo to the police chief, that one driver pulled over, John H.
Garrison received free gas from Oliver’s service station.155 This service station also
happened to be one of those that received a check from the MIA as recorded by
police on January 16th.156 Similar to Oliver’s service station, within the first three
months of the boycott more than ten service stations were receiving weekly checks
153
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from the MIA covering the costs of carpoolers’ gas, maintenance, and repairs.157 The
MIA was paying the tab for the carpoolers. The MIA either prepaid for gas, or the
service station kept track of the amount owed, which the MIA covered later. The
cars were at the center of an intricate economic web that pooled money both from
the local and national community supporting the MIA, spread it out to pro-boycott
and predominately black automobile businesses, and then benefited the boycotters
through the dispersal of funds through the form of gasoline. This web made the
carpools an affordable alternative to the buses.158 Furthermore the MIA ensured
accessibility to the carpools by having thirty-three separate dispatch locations and
forty pick up stations across the city that ran on a time schedule and a calling
system.159 Dispatchers received calls and had the nearest dispatch stations send a
car to pick passengers up creating a system that functioned well enough to keep
those in need of transportation off the buses. This system was a complex, massive,
and organized network that kept hundreds of cars fueled, the riders mobile, and the
buses empty. Hundreds of cars, even more hundreds of drivers, and thousands of
passengers made up this carpool.160
The night of Garrison’s traffic stop police sent officers to try and gain
information from a mass meeting held at the Bula Baptist Church, and noted in their
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Memo to the police chief outlining the meeting that, “There was about 500 Cars [sic]
parked near this church last night.”161 Similarly throughout the boycott the police
recorded over 300 different vehicles that they stopped, all of which participated in
the carpool.162 The MIA’s fundraising abilities, and coordination were on display
here as it took large sums of money, and supreme organization to keep such a large
number of cars operating in the carpool. The African Americans of Montgomery
became masters of pooling and systematizing resources pertaining to the
technological system of the automobile. These tasks were not easily executed, and
those operating, running, and organizing the carpool needed keen managerial skills.
Their abilities to fundraise, organize, and construct a mass public transportation
system, paired with a detailed knowledge of the law allowed the boycotters to avoid
police efforts to dismantle the carpool.
The MIA’s complex methods of paying gas stations with donated money, then
allowing carpoolers to receive free gas, allowed them to circumvent a law on the
books that made any unlicensed taxicab service illegal. The boycotters were made
well aware through mass meetings dispersing legal information from the NAACP
that the police could arrest any driver who accepted money from a passenger. Had a
driver accepted money, he could be charged with running an illegal taxi service.163
A taxicab could be defined as any vehicle that charged a fare to passengers. If any
car is deemed to be a taxicab it the driver then came under an extensive set of
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regulations including the need for a state taxicab license, a special driver’s
registration and license, and more poignantly must be segregated and not deny
passengers. This meant that if the police could prove the carpool was in fact a
taxicab service, they could bring the carpool under state regulation and effectively
abolish the carpool. Furthermore they could arrest and fine every driver of the
carpool for illegally operating a taxicab. In this way the police could end the carpool
and effectively end the boycott. This was the police’s hope. Throughout the entire
boycott police tried to prove that drivers were accepting donations directly. This
was the reason for the MIA’s payment systems. In this way the African American
community of Montgomery was able to pool their money and financially support the
boycott, and pro-boycott businesses without breaking any laws.164 The service
stations were crucial to the success of the carpools, and therefore the boycott, and
the businessmen who owned these stations took active steps to assist the carpools.
One such businessman, Fletcher Smith, was an African American born and
raised in Montgomery. Smith owned the College Hill Service Station and not only
worked with the MIA to pay for carpoolers’ gas, but also provided a vehicle to assist
in the carpool. On January 24th police officers pulled over Burl Mack Averhart, a
reverend and active boycotter in a Willy’s station wagon. The police recorded that
Averhart, “drives this station wagon all day for Fletcher Smith owner of the College
Hill Service Station. Hauls negroes all day. Fills up with gas anytime he needs it.
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Made (2) trips in and out of this pickup station.”165 Smith was a black businessman
dedicated to the boycott efforts, and used his successes as a businessman to make
his work vehicle available for the carpool. The boycott was not going to work
without carpoolers; the carpoolers were not going anywhere without vehicles; and
the vehicles were useless without someone filling their tanks. Smith filled several of
these crucial roles. He provided a vehicle, and gasoline and could afford to do so in
part because of the increased business generated by the boycott itself. Between
December 1st and March 7th the MIA paid Smith $419.48.166 This money went to gas
for the cars in the carpool, and was what allowed for Burl Mack Averhart to fill up
“any time he needs it.” Not only was the black community of Montgomery
supporting black businesses in the form of service stations, they were also bringing
new income to those businesses. Furthermore, black business owners served an
activist role to better the lives of their community, and it all centered on the
automobile. When cars broke, drivers needed them serviced. When the tank was
empty, it needed to be filled. And when the MIA needed to buy station wagons, they
turned to car dealers.
Along with buying gasoline, the MIA used the pooled money to purchase
dozens of station wagons. These cars were typically brand new Chevrolet station
wagons, and while Chevrolet is a blue-collar company, these specific station wagons
were fully loaded with numerous available options. This included power steering,

The Montgomery Police Department “Memo to Solicitor Thetford: Corrected to Negro Boycott”
January 24 1956. (RPMA)
166 Alabama Attorney General’s Office, “Montgomery Bus Boycott trial transcript,” 1956, exhibit 12.
165

71
Powerglide automatic transmissions, turn signals, heaters, and the V8 engines.167
The police officers stated it best, “in other words they paid several hundred dollars
more for the wagons they bought…”168 The MIA and leadership of the boycott were
concerned with more than just the utility of the station wagons. They wanted
vehicles that could give many passengers rides, but they also wanted them to be as
easy to drive as possible. The power steering and automatic transmissions made
operating the vehicles enormously easier than station wagons without these
options. The automatic transmissions particularly added to the ease of operation as
the driver would not need to know how to use a clutch and therefore would not stall
the car while in operation. The turn signals allowed the drivers to only need to know
how to operate a simple lever rather than remember the hand signals that were
otherwise required when turning. The powerful V8 engines allowed the cars to
easily haul large loads of passengers, an aspect that was important to the success of
the carpool. The V8 engines were an investment to insure that each car could haul as
many passengers as possible increasing the efficiency of the station wagons. The
heaters while not making the car necessarily easier to drive, made them far more
comfortable for both drivers and passengers in the cold winter weather of
Montgomery. Making the cars safer and easier to drive meant that drivers could
volunteer without having large amounts of expertise or experience driving. This also
meant that drivers were less likely to place themselves in situations that made them
open to tickets. If a driver were to stall the car in the middle of the road, fail to use
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hand turn signals, or impede traffic the driver could be subject to tickets from the
police. By paying more for these options the MIA was investing in the longevity of
the carpool and thus the boycott.169
These station wagons came to be called “rolling churches” as they each bore
bumper stickers of the respective churches that purchased them.170 A church bought
a vehicle through the donations made directly to that church, or more commonly the
car was purchased in a church’s name, and the MIA later reimbursed that specific
church.171 In this way, the MIA could again keep from breaking any laws regarding
illegal taxi services. If the vehicles were all in the name of churches, or religious
leaders they were not considered owned by one business or organization. Had they
all been owned by the MIA, the police might have had an avenue to prosecute the
MIA leadership. The black citizens of Montgomery successfully and rapidly armed
their bus boycott with the tools required, and the streets filled with automobiles.172
For police this only cemented their continued surveillance efforts.
The experience of driving and riding in the carpools was a drastic change
from the transportation of Montgomery buses. The passengers of the carpools were
not subject to racialized abuses that threatened them on the buses. By removing
themselves from the buses, the drivers and passengers of the carpools were seizing
The Montgomery Police Department “Memo to Capt. Brown: Investigation” May 1, 1956. (RPMA
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power where they previously were denied. Like the jitney buses forty years earlier,
the carpool arguably increased segregation. Black drivers and black passengers
overwhelmingly dominated the cars of the carpool, leaving the buses with
exclusively white drivers and white passengers.173 And again recalling the jitney
experiment, this segregation was no longer on white terms. Whites had previously
won control over transportation and mobility and established the shape and form
segregation would take: white drivers with white passengers in the front of buses,
and black passengers in the back of them as subjects of white authority just like on
Gilded Age railroads, and turn of the century streetcars. Whites told African
Americans where they were allowed to be.174 But in the new segregation of the
carpools, like the black run jitneys before them, African Americans decided where to
be. White authority, represented by the police, wanted to get African Americans out
of the carpools and back onto the buses. Authority over physical and social space
was a cornerstone in the great cathedral of white supremacy, and any changes
threatened the status quo.
Cars not only changed the spaces of segregation, but also served as tools of
change for spatial conceptualizations. Cars provided security, and with security
came a shift in individuals’ understanding of actual physical space. Cars shortened
distance. Perceptions of spaces were continually shifting and as one boycotter, John
F. Sawyer Jr., explained, nightfall dramatically changed these conceptualizations of
space and time. Sawyer walked to Alabama State University during the day in order
“Negroes Pledge to Keep Boycott,” New York Times, February 24, 1956 http://query.nytimes.com
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to get to classes, but at night used the carpool system. Sawyer perceived the distance
from his home during the day to be short enough to walk, but the danger that night
brought made it feel much longer. This lengthened space was “too far to walk” and
that is when Sawyer used the carpool as a tool of transportation, and also safety. 175
The distance between the same two points shifted from being short enough to walk,
to too long to walk due to nightfall, and then back to a safe distance when Sawyer
rode in a car.176 Cars had the power to change an individual’s perceptions of space,
provide safety, aid the boycott, and ultimately serve their designed purpose of
transportation.
The African Americans of Montgomery were not seeking to overthrow white
supremacy over all social spaces. As clearly stated in their demands to the city they
were not boycotting to rid Montgomery of segregated pools, theaters, or water
fountains; just buses.177 But even then, any contention over space was not going to
be won by African Americans easily, and the whites seeking to maintain Jim Crow
were not going to give in without a fight. In Montgomery this resistance came in the
forms of the Ku Klux Klan, an organization that terrorized African Americans for
decades, the White Citizen’s Council, a volunteer organization whose members often
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were also part of the Klan, and most publicly, consistently and principally, the
Montgomery Police Department.178
White authority was faced with a problem. African Americans were
challenging white power, and the Montgomery Police Department was not willing to
let that challenge go unanswered. While it is not clear if there were any African
American members of the Montgomery Police Department, the police most certainly
acted against the boycott and specifically against the carpool seeking to curb any
success gained by the civil rights activists in Montgomery. A challenge to
segregation was a challenge to the law and therefore a challenge to police authority
and white supremacy. Jim Crow laws forced the white supremacy agenda upon law
enforcement, and while many officers likely were in agreement with this agenda and
welcomed its reign over law enforcement, even those who might disagree were
legally obligated to uphold white supremacy. They began a campaign against the
boycott, but before anything else was to be done, they needed information. The
Montgomery Improvement Association was careful about what they shared with the
Montgomery public and officials. Aware of the power of information, the MIA
disseminated their demands to the public, but did not disperse full information
regarding their plans for boycotting the buses in the same manner.179 While the MIA
made their goals clear via paper leaflets and a formal letter to the mayor of
Montgomery, W.A. Gayle who consistently encouraged the Montgomery Police
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Department’s surveillance efforts, they remained insular when it came to the
strategies they would employ to subvert the bus system.180 This information was
reserved to the mass meetings that were organized at various black churches within
the Montgomery community. The First Baptist Church, and the Holt Street Baptist
Church primarily hosted these meetings.181 This allowed the MIA and the NAACP to
organize, and disperse information within their own community. This information
included instructions from the NAACP on how to avoid arrest, “pep talks” from black
ministers, and any other pertinent information that was called for on a day-by-day
basis.182 If the streets and parking lots of Montgomery became the spaces for
pooling of cars, the churches became the spaces for the pooling of legal and social
resources. The churches were also spaces in which African Americans held
authority, and they could exclude the prying eyes and ears of Montgomery’s police
officers.
The insular nature of the MIA meant that police could not readily gain access
to the MIA’s plans, something that they themselves recognized would be a major
obstacle to the campaign to get African Americans back onto the buses. This led the
Montgomery Police Department to pool resources themselves as they organized a
formal investigation into the MIA and other bodies associated with the boycott. 183
While the NAACP was at the legal forefront of the boycott, preparing a case to be
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tried before the Supreme Court, the MIA was the primary face of the boycott, making
them the primary target for the police. This investigation quickly turned into what
today is called a task force, as police pooled resources, officers, and willing civilians
to focus their attention on the bus boycott.
Early in the investigation the police were desperate to obtain any
information they could get their hands on. Police questioned members of the black
community, hoping to glean some sense of the organization and plans of the boycott,
and they were willing to listen to virtually anyone, including an anonymous
informant described as X2 an “informant” who was recognizably drunk and
disorderly during the police’s interaction and most likely sought financial gains from
the police who were offering rewards for information.184 The meeting with X2
indicates that police were willing to talk to virtually anyone, and desperate for
information.
As early as January 13, 1956, only a little over a month into the boycott,
police officers started systematically checking the bank accounts of members of the
MIA and the Alabama Council on Human Relations (ACHR) including leader Robert
E. Hughes who previously served as an intermediary who facilitated the first
meeting between the MIA and city officials. 185 The ACHR was an offshoot of the
Commission on Interracial Cooperation, a national group that as early as 1919 was
organized in response to intense racial violence faced by African Americans

The Montgomery Police Department “Memo to Solicitor Thetford: Informant” January 28, 1956.
(RPMA)
185 The Montgomery Police Department “Memo to Solicitor Thetford: Corrected to Negro Boycott”
January 13th 1956. (RPMA)
184

78
following World War I.186 The ACHR largely consisted of the African Americans who
sought the most pragmatic of solutions. They were the ones who pushed strongest
for the MIA to make their initial demands tamer, and prior to the bus boycott were
the body that typically raised issues of the black community that did not seek to
challenge white supremacy.187 However as it became clear the boycott was not an
ephemeral attempt to secure civil rights but rather a dedicated campaign to force
the desegregation of the buses with the mass of Montgomery’s black population
involved, the ACHR then worked in tandem with the MIA to keep the carpools
rolling. The initial facilitation seems to have been what made Hughes a target for
police surveillance.188 The police not only checked Hughes’ personal bank accounts,
those shared with his wife, but also the accounts that Hughes held under the name
of the Alabama Council on Human Relations. The bank that held these records, The
First National, also gave the investigators information regarding Martin Luther King
Jr.’s bank accounts, but explained that they did not have the information police
wanted regarding the accounts of E.D. Nixon and the NAACP.189
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Police were quickly placing emphasis upon donations and funds that were
held by leadership of the boycott. If they could find the money, they could also find
where the money was going. Within the January 13th memo, regarding Hughes’
family account information, police reported that, “They now have $12.00 in the
account. The most they have ever had in it was $339.00 They also have a checking
account for the Ala. Council on Human Relations…It now has $225.00 in it. The most
it has ever had in it was $340.00.” The memo similarly explains Dr. King’s account
balance and the max balance, as well as stating that King primarily deposits small
checks. This fixation on the movement of money does not have a clear explanation
until later in the memo the police note that the staff at the bank made it known to
officers that, “the NAACP had gone to the Bosswell Motor Co. and had put in an
order for 12 large station wagons. We checked on this and this Motor Co. has been
asked to bid on from six to twelve station wagons, we haven’t checked yet but
assume that some of the other Motor CO. [sic] has been asked to give a bid also.” For
the Montgomery officers, the movement of money was tied directly to the acquiring
of cars. This became a trend in police searches of bank records, and follow-ups to
car dealers and other businesses associated with automobiles. This link led officers
to focus on just that: they became obsessed with cars.190
The MIA was not just content with organizing the carpool and funding it.
They continued to purchase vehicles for the carpool throughout the boycott and
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shopped around in search of the best deals that they could get.191 Furthermore they
were seemingly always one step ahead of the police. At the mass meetings they
knew that police might well try to use the taxi-cab law to go after the boycott and
they were correct.
Following their investigation into Robert E. Hughes’ private bank accounts
the police immediately set to establish what would become the center piece of
police activity against the boycott: the regular surveillance campaign and
harassment of black drivers. Police placed patrol cars at the stops of the carpools.
On January 23, 1956, police pulled over twelve vehicles, all driven by African
Americans and packed with African American passengers. They questioned the
drivers, took down the make and model and license plates of the cars, recorded the
addresses of the drivers and specifically focused on finding out if any passengers
were paying for their rides.192 One driver, David Harris, stated that the only people
in the car were his family. This seems a benign inclusion, however this was a
common tactic employed by the carpoolers. In attempts to keep themselves from
arousing suspicion or further harassment from the police, carpoolers often claimed
that their passengers were all related to the driver, possibly exploiting racist white
perceptions that all African Americans look alike.193
In addition to collecting information from cars they pulled over, police also
issued numerous tickets to carpoolers, hoping to financially hurt the boycott, and
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also arrested drivers on unfounded bases. Martin Luther King Jr. explained that
police issued drivers with, “…a series of arrests for minor and often imaginary traffic
violations. People who had never received a ticket were booked, and on several
occasions taken to jail.”194 Jo Ann Robinson further explained that, “many of those
policemen would just give hundreds and hundreds of tickets every day to people
who were not violating any traffic laws.”195 While this tactic was meant to deter the
carpoolers, the MIA countered the police’s aggressive ticketing and arrests by using
the money they were collecting to aid drivers who received tickets, establishing a
budget specifically for “fines and penalties.”196 The ticketing, while certainly another
obstacle for the boycotters, would not end the carpool. But the police continued
their ticketing and surveillance efforts.
On a nearly daily basis police conducted surveillance at various carpool hubs
and, “stopped every car that had a load of negroes.”197 Police were not pulling
drivers over because of infractions, not pulling them over for breaking the law, but
pulling them over because they were black. By pulling these drivers over police
were using the driver’s race as reason enough to stop their vehicle and conduct a
search. No warrants were issued, and no probable cause established other than the
driver’s complexion. These cars full of black passengers were a common sight on the
streets of Montgomery during the year-long boycott.198 If the police saw any car full
of black people, it was reason enough to pull the car over, check the license of the
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driver, record the license plate number and make and model of the car as well as ask
the driver and passengers questions, seeking to gain further information about the
carpool. But they couldn’t prove that anyone was paying for their rides, and
therefore couldn’t shut the carpools down. The police lacked the power to stop the
carpools, and the carpoolers knew it. The carpoolers consistently based their
interactions with the police on the knowledge being fed to them by the NAACP at the
mass meetings. They knew not to volunteer information and knew specifically not to
let the officers in on how the money got from the MIA to the service stations. Despite
being systematically racially profiled, ticketed and fined the drivers and passengers
alike kept their composure and did not provide incriminating information to the
police.199 It was a rare moment in Montgomery’s history. One in which white
supremacy was showing signs of wear. The threat of power slipping through the
fingers of white authority pushed police past surveillance and ticketing. They sought
legal advice in order to take back the power they were loosing, to find or create a
means to return to the status quo, before that early December morning when the
busses first ran empty of black passengers..
In May of 1956 police met with Mr. Burchfield and Mr. Brooks from the
Public Service Commission (PSC), a quasi-official community organization that
legally aided in fighting the boycott.200 During this meeting the police recorded that,
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“They stated they were ready to work with us on anything and as long as it took to
get the results that we’re after. We talked about these station-wagons that was [sic]
being used to haul negro’s back and forth to work.”201 The police conducted this
outreach as a means of obtaining further information and aid against the boycott.
The topic of most interest, as usual for the Montgomery police during 1956, was
cars. The police and the members of the Public Service Commission wanted the
boycotters out of the station wagons and back onto the buses, but once again they
were faced with the reality that they did not hold the legal power to realize this
desire. The police explained, “We [the police and PSC members] checked the law
books, both city and state and we could not find any law that we could work on
unless we could prove that the negro passengers were paying to ride these station
wagons.”202 The police were searching for anything they could use to break the
boycott. The only law that could conceivably be used against the carpool was that
taxicab registration, but police failed thus far to prove the passengers were paying
fares. The police were faced with the reality that the black community discovered a
means of subverting white authority, white-controlled segregation, and white
supremacy and the police had no idea what to do to stop it. Their desperation once
again showed as they searched for some form of power they could deploy or exploit
to break up the carpools, and it did not matter if the boycott was not breaking any
laws. It was as if the police were operating under the assumption that anything that
threatened the status quo, anything that could take power out of the hands of white
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authority, and anything that they just flat out did not like, was therefore illegal, or
should be. [In a sense they were operating on the generally accepted notion that the
intent of the law can be a guide to interpreting its application to novel situations. In
this way their efforts might be read as acknowledging that the intent of the laws in
Montgomery were, indeed, to keep blacks suppressed and support white
supremacy.] The police refused to accept that power could be taken from them
within the system they helped build. The carpool was operating well within the law
that had been established, and had for so long helped maintain white supremacy.
While boycotters built upon knowledge gained through the experience with jitneys,
police clearly had not, however the same tactics used against the jitneys could not
succeed against the carpools in large part due to the Brown v. Board decision and in
part because of the prevalence of the automobile. The cars used in the carpools
were, for the majority, unmodified, unlike the jitneys used decades before.
The police did not stop searching for a means to pull the wheels off the
carpool, and understood that they were not experts in the field of interpreting laws
to repress black power. That was a job for a lawyer. With this in mind police officers
accompanied by a member of the PSC, drove to Birmingham to meet with a lawyer
named Maurice Bishop.203 Bishop confirmed the officers’ fears explaining that he,
“read our [Montgomery’s] city code and that he could not find anything in the code
that would be of much help.”204 The police did not desire to simply enforce the law,
rather they hoped to bend the law to their desire. The police whose job is not

203
204

The Montgomery Police Department “Memo to Capt. Brown: Investigation” May 1, 1956. (RPMA)
The Montgomery Police Department “Memo to Capt. Brown: Investigation” May 1, 1956. (RPMA)

85
supposed to entail arresting or fining those they simply wish to, but rather enforce
the law and arrest those who break it, once again demonstrated that they viewed
their job in other terms. For the police officers in 1956 Montgomery, their job was to
maintain white supremacy, and they did not stop trying to do their job. Police
officers and Bishop colluded in order to design a means to indirectly keep the
carpools from continuing.205 Bishop explained that the “City Commissioners could
meet and pass an ordinance requiring any person or person’s using a vehicle to haul
more than (5) or more than (6) persons to show proof of a certain amount of
liability insurance.”206 Bishop inspired police to look further into insurance as a
means of stopping the carpool. If they could revoke the registration of the cars, they
in theory could arrest the drivers for operating a vehicle without insurance and thus
they in theory could stop the carpool.
The police continued on their quest to end the boycott. Police brought
private white businesses into the fold and took an activist stance to end the boycott.
Car insurance became part of the focus for police. They met with Richard Hanna, a
good friend of one of the police officers who was “connected with the Lawyer’s
insurance Co.”207 After talking to Mr. Hanna, police learned that thirteen of the
station wagons had insurance policies held by Lawyer’s Insurance Co. Mr. Hanna
also informed police that he and the rest of Lawyer’s Insurance Co. would agree to
not write any more insurance policies for the station wagons. Not only did Hanna
agree to not write any more policies, but he also decided to cancel the existing
Bishop agreed to work at length with police, free of charge.
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policies. Other insurance companies followed suit, and as Martin Luther King Jr. put
it, “Insurance agents decided, almost overnight, to refuse to insure out station
wagons, contending that the risk was too high. The liability insurance on our station
wagons was cancelled no less than four times within four months. (We had no
trouble with the collision insurance because it was a negro company.)”208 Clearly
money talked in Montgomery, Alabama. Although the Lawyer’s Insurance Co. and
other like it were willing to stop issuing and even cancel insurance to the boycotters,
they initially seemed to have no problem selling the first policies. It is unlikely that
the owners and employees of the companies suddenly changed their feelings about
the boycott. What is more likely is that the companies were willing to take anyone’s
money for policies, including boycotters who they did not politically agree with.
Money was power. African Americans used money to change the rules of social
interaction, and as King stated, they drew further power through working with
black owned businesses. If the black community brought enough money to the table,
some conservative members of the white community were willing to work with
them. The police however took an active role in trying to get insurance companies to
cease writing policies, which could then provide police with a means to end the
boycott. Insurance was necessary for vehicles to legally drive on the streets, and
while King was told the policies were cancelled due to the risk being “too high” it is
no coincidence that the string of cancellations directly followed the police’s visit to
Mr. Hanna. Overnight insurance companies got on board with the police.
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The carpool was not the only place that the automobile was employed to get
black members of Montgomery’s community to and from work. Support at times
came from white wealthy women, who did not want to loose their black maids and
help. Virginia Durr, a rare white supporter of the movement, and friend to many of
the boycott’s leaders explained, “The mayor of the town issued an order that all
black maids must be dismissed in order to break the boycott. Well, their reply was,
‘Tell the mayor to come and do my work for me, then.’ So white women went and
got the black women in the car.”209 This was a new twist that neither the mayor, the
police, or the leaders of the boycott had seen coming.210
During the post-war period of the 1950s consumerism had encouraged
households to purchase his and her cars, and now the “her” cars were going
downtown and aiding the boycott. White women used their cars to purposefully
help themselves, but in turn helped the boycott as well. Loosing household labor
was significant enough for some white women to break from the white norm of not
assisting African Americans with transportation during the boycott. 211 For African
Americans, the motives of the wealthy white women did not matter: these women
utilized their cars to bring a new source of transportation to the movement, and
used the freedom of their cars to ignore and even challenge prominent male figures’
desires. Often the wealthy white women would make excuses for their actions
saying, “The bus broke down and there was no other way the help could get
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here.”212 However, these excuses were simply made to save face because according
to Jo Ann Robinson, “Not a single maid was riding those buses.”213 Some white
women truly did believe these excuses though. Marian Young, a black maid was
asked by her white employer in front of Virginia Durr, whether Young or her family
had anything to do with the boycott. Young replied that not a single one of them was
part of the boycott and didn’t support it. When the employer left, Durr turned to
Young and exclaimed that she very well knew just about every one of her family had
an active role in the boycott. Young then replied, “Well you know, when you have
your hand near the lion’s mouth, its best to just pat the lion on the head. Besides,
you know Mrs. Durr, I didn’t want to stop getting rides in that fancy Cadillac.” 214
These white women were exempt from police surveillance. That fact that their
transportation of their black maids was largely self-serving meant that police
officers had no reason to stop and harass these white women. Furthermore these
women, being part of the white community and typically as Young’s employers was,
against the boycott itself, nevertheless their need for black maids outweighed their
desire to maintain segregation.
Despite all of the activism, and continued surveillance and harassment of
carpoolers, the police could not get the cars off the roads. The boycotters had set up
an entirely separate transportation system that was highly organized and arguably
more effective than the buses, drawing all of the income generated by black
passengers away from the buses, and circulating it back into the black community.
Durr, Outside the Magic Circle, 167.
Robinson, The Montgomery Bus Boycott and the Women Who Started It, 103.
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The white-owned buses folded eventually because of the financial havoc the boycott
was wreaking upon the bus company’s profits. Cars in the Montgomery Bus Boycott
literally and figuratively carried the movement. Cars were utilized in many ways by
many people, ranging from average boycotters to wealthy white housewives, and
were the primary reason for the success of the boycott. The financial blow that the
cars enabled led to enormous economic incentive to abandon segregation on city
buses. Just as the jitneys of the 1910s had, the carpoolers of the boycott proved that
cars were a viable and effective way to challenge the status quo of transportation
culture.
Browder v Gayle was the final blow to segregation on the Montgomery Bus
Lines.215 The NAACP successfully petitioned the courts and brought Claudette
Colvin’s arrest to the federal level when it reached the Supreme Court. Indeed
Colvin’s refusal to leave her seat did not come without its fruits. Her case was the
one that the NAACP worked on to bring to the Supreme Court in part because hers
came prior to Rosa Parks’ and also being a child going to school made public
transportation all the more necessary.216 In accord with the Brown v. Board decision
two years earlier, the court ruled that bus segregation violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. With a federal ruling that specifically applied to Montgomery bus
segregation, along with the Montgomery City Lines’ desire to integrate in order to
keep the business from filing for bankruptcy, legal segregation officially ended on
December 20th 1956. Montgomery’s black community filled the seats, both in the
Thomas F. Jackson, From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin Luther King and the Struggle for
Economic Justice (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 53.
216 Hoose, Claudette Colvin, 50-52.
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front and back, of the Montgomery City Lines buses. On that day African Americans
and whites sat alongside one another and Martin Luther King Jr., who as the
president of the MIA newspapers made the figurehead of the boycott, declared the
boycott a success. 217 The boycott officially lasted 381 days surviving police
surveillance, mass ticketing, violence and intimidation via the Klan typically in the
form of church bombings, mass arrests, and daily challenges too numerous to list.
The most important tool that kept the boycott alive was the automobile.
Despite Browder v. Gayle, and despite the integration of Montgomery’s buses,
the struggle wasn’t over just because the boycott was over. Montgomery did not
suddenly become a paradise of racial understanding and equality. In fact directly
following the integration of the buses, Montgomery experienced a spree of
seemingly unconnected violent crimes aimed toward buses and black motorists.218
On the same day that the supreme court ruling was handed down making bus
segregation illegal, B.D. Lambert, a black preacher and active member in the boycott,
filed a complaint with the police department alleging that a motorcycle police officer
threw acid onto Lambert’s brand new 1957 Mercury. Throwing acid on a car does
not impinge on the use of the vehicle. It still drives, still turns, still can bring people
to and fro. But it does damage the image of the vehicle, and image was a major
selling and buying point for the 1957 Mercury. The Lamberts likely held a sense of
pride owning brand new Mercury. Cars have long been a status symbol, but they
“Negroes to Ride Montgomery Buses in Bias Test Today,” New York Times, December 20, 1956.
There is little evidence other than police reports and newspaper articles regarding these attacks,
none of which give any information regarding the identity of the perpetrators other than that they
were white males. In each attack a different number of whites were reported to carry out the
assaults, and a variety of weapons and strategies were used pointing to likely unorganized terrorist
attacks rather than a connected organization of violent whites.
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were even more meaningful in 1956 Montgomery as they were the tools used to
work towards equality under the law, and a Mercury was not considered a blue
collar car, adding to the sense of accomplishment that likely came with the purchase
of the vehicle. The Lamberts were also likely one of the first families to own a 1957
Mercury in Montgomery. The winter of 1956 was the beginning of the new car
season, so it is fairly remarkable that the lamberts were able to purchase their car. A
1957 Mercury bears a sense of presence with it’s tapered creased fins, skylight dual
curve windshield, extra wide chromed grill, push button transmission, projectile
side theme, large dual squared bumpers, v-angle tail-lights.219 The thing was sleek.
And the Lamberts’ mercury was now marred.
The police went to Lambert’s house, inspected the car finding that some
substance had ruined the paint on a portion of the car, questioned the Lamberts and
then dropped the case with no further investigation.220 While it may never be
known whether an officer actually did such an act, it is difficult to conceive of a
reason Lambert would make up such a tale. Assuming that the report was truthful,
the idea that the same day that control over black mobility was taken away from the
Montgomery City Council the police retaliated on a citizen in such a way
demonstrates the clear frustration that came along with the loss of authority on the
police’s part, and cars were clearly still seen as a source of power and as a symbol of
African Americans’ success.

219“Straight

out of Tomorrow 1957 Mercury with Dream-Car Desgin.” Mercury Brochure
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Days following the acid incident another act of aggression and violence
targeted black motorists. On December 24th following the first integrated busing in
Montgomery, Henry Jackson Sr. and his family, while driving home from picking
their son up from jail, were engaged by two cars full of angry, armed, violent white
males. Jackson was forced by gunpoint to pull the car over and then his daughter-inlaw was dragged from the car and beaten as the fourteen white men brandished
pistols and shotguns repeatedly threatening Jackson and the other black men in the
car. One of the white men then yelled, “You niggers can’t ride the bus with the white
folks and you can’t ride a car around here.” Jackson was then struck over the head
opening a cut and the family fled.221 The law and police failed to keep segregation on
the buses, so those prejudiced whites who refused to accept the supreme court
ruling took matters into their own hands. These fourteen men believed that the
status quo of white supremacy gave them authority to intimidate and attack African
Americans in the pursuit of preserving that same white supremacy. Following the
end of the boycott and carpool, cars were still seen by both the black and white
community as objects of power, a perception cultivated nationally by automobile
advertising.222 The threat of violence to black automobile drivers specifically
signifies that these white men, in attempting to preserve white power and white
supremacy, sought to take the power of the automobile away from the black
community. Furthermore they clearly demonstrated their desire to maintain
segregation and even bring it to a higher level on the buses and affirmed that if the
Montgomery Police Department “Supplementary Police Report: Henry Jackson” December 25,
1956. (RPMA)
222 Heitmann, The Automobile and American Life, 69-70.
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law would not enforce segregation they would use violence to do so. These men did
not contend that African Americans could not sit where they pleased on the buses,
they demanded that they not use the buses at all. While the buses had been virtually
white only for an entire year, it was by black choice and design. In this case the
violent whites were now attempting to bar African Americans from the space of the
bus entirely. They wanted to maintain the absence of African Americans on the
buses, but wanted to do so on their own terms, not on those of the black community.
Violence was going to be their tool to reestablish white supremacy on the buses.
Violence was going to be the tool with which the whites attempted to reclaim
authority over black mobility, over mental, social, and physical space. Similar white
reactions proved again and again to be a prominent factor in Montgomery in the
following days, weeks, and months.223
Violent attacks escalated quickly. On December 26th, following the Jackson’s
assault gunshots rang out on the streets of Montgomery two times, all directed
toward the buses. The first of these came from a shotgun that shattered a bus
window while the bus was in operation.224 Behind that window was a young black
girl whose name is unknown. While the bus driver, a white man named H.L. Warren,
asked that all four of the black passengers on the bus write their names down so
they could be contacted later, all refused. This is likely due to the fear and distrust of

W.A. Gayle, Letter to J.H. Bagley, March 14, 1956, J.H. Bagley Papers (ADAH)
Montgomery Police Department, “Supplementary Offense Report: H.L. Warren” December 26,
1956. (RPMA)
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the police created in part by the year-long police campaign against the carpool. For
the black citizens of Montgomery, it was clear which side the police were on, still.225
The next attack came two days after.226 Another shooting at another bus; this
time someone was actually shot.227 Rosa Jordan, a 22 year old black woman was
shot in the legs while eight months pregnant.228 Jordan could not have the bullet
removed for over a month, as it was deemed too dangerous for her to have the
surgery to extract the bullet. This was again an act of violence that was in direct
retaliation to the bus boycott. The most extreme of the white segregationists were
those willing to shoot at buses and bomb churches. These were more than just acts
of violence. They were acts of terror. The goal of shooting a bus was to terrorize
African Americans into not riding the buses at all. The whites went from trying to
force the black community back onto the buses, to trying to force them off. When the
law no longer provided whites the legal authority to dictate the racial division of
space, they attempted to do so through raw power, through violent acts of
terrorism. And under the correct assumption that white power still reigned

This is not to say that all black people in Montgomery feared and distrusted the police. The
Jackson’s went to the police and filed a complaint after the assault. B.D. Lampert filed a complaint
following the acid incident. However nothing was done about either case, and it is likely that after the
police campaign to keep African Americans from subverting the buses, large portions of the black
community did not believe the police would aid them in any way. The fact that these four passengers
refused to even give their names indicated that there existed a fear in making themselves known to
the police.
226 Fannie Curtis, “Police Report” December 28, 1956. (RPMA)
227 Montgomery Police Department, “Supplementary Offense Report: Mr. W.H. Fullilove” December
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supreme, no arrests were ever made in connection to such retaliatory acts of
terrorism.229
Attacks continued on the buses in the form of sniper campaigns, and violence
in Montgomery escalated with numerous bombings of black churches. Roughly two
months following Browder v Gayle, in a letter drafted to the President Eisenhower,
black leadership in the south requested the President to come to the south and give,
“A major speech in a major southern city urging all southerners to abide by the
Supreme Court’s decision as the law of the land.”230 The leaders justified their
request explaining:
In Alabama Christian Churches literally have been destroyed by
dynamite and T.N.T. Numerous individuals including women have
been beaten on the streets. The homes of Negro leaders have been
bombed. Men and women, black and white, sitting in buses peacefully
have been targeted by snipers. A fortnight ago a 15 year old girl was
brutally beaten. A few days ago the legs of a woman 8 months
pregnant were shattered by a gun...A state of terror prevails. 231

It is important to note that several of these violent acts are mentioned in Branch, Parting the
Waters, but in little detail. Branch does not establish the terror campaign that swept through
Montgomery. I seek to extend Branch’s work here and apply it directly to the automobile. Violence
was predominantly aimed at vehicles of mobility, and Branch does not fully develop the meaning of
this violence, rather uses it as anecdotes to show that things were not simply over following the
integration of buses in Montgomery. Branch, 154.
230 M.L. King Jr., C.K. Steele, F.L. Shuttlesworth, and T.J. Jemison to President Eisenhower, “Extreme
Violence Continues” January 11, 1957 in Clayborne Carson, Susan Carson, Adrienne Clay, Virginia
Shardon, and Kieran Taylor eds., The Papers of Martin Luther King Jr., Volume IV: A Symbol of the
Movement, January 1957-December 1958 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 100.
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The leaders sought out a higher authority to reestablish law. This spree of violence,
along with the need to appeal to the president, further indicated that the
segregationists’ saw white supremacy as more powerful than the law. The word
spree is specifically relevant here. The immediate and intense nature of these
violent attacks cannot be overstated. These were acts of terror directly related to
the legal and active success of the boycott. While intimidation and bombings did
occur during the boycott, the violence had not been this extreme, routine and
severe. These acts were directly correlated to the Supreme Court decision and the
integration of the buses. The buses for an entire year were devoid of black faces, and
while integration became law, the actual space of the bus and segregation of that
space did not experience drastic change.
Violence continued in Montgomery even after the pleas to Eisenhower. On
April 16th, 1957 Montgomery police officers responded to a call regarding a fight on
a bus. When officers arrived they discovered that a white man named James Brice
attacked four black teenage girls with a wrench after demanding that one of the
teenagers, Josephine Boldin “get her black ass back to where she belongs” 232 Brice
then engaged in a “tussle” with Annie Burch, one of the other teenagers, hitting her
in the head with the wrench and wrestling on the bus floor.233 After falling out the
front of the bus, Brice stood and shouted, “I should go get my gun and kill all you
dam [sic] niggers.”234 When the police arrived on the scene, Brice was the only
member of the fight still present. Police took his story down, which left out attacking
Annie Burch, “Witness Testimonial Statement,” April 16th 1957. (RPMA)
Johnnie Mae Eaves, “Witness Testimonial Statement,” April 16th 1957. (RPMA)
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the girls with a wrench and threatening to kill them, and issued warrants for the
arrest of the teenagers. Upon taking the girls’ testimonies though it became clear
that Brice was not providing the full truth as all four girls provided similar
testimonies. Space was clearly still being contested on the buses of Montgomery,
however an important change took place, the officers no longer bore the power to
arrest the four teenage girls for sitting wherever they pleased. Unlike Claudette
Colvin and Rosa Parks, the girls were not violating any part of the law, and while
James Brice was not content with their seating arrangements, the police could do
nothing to stop them. Segregation, at times, however did continue in a more subtle
form.
After the boycott, while the Supreme Court decision made forced segregation
illegal, in practice segregation was still alive, but only by the choice of Montgomery’s
citizens. Bus driver H.L. Warren explained that in practice, the African American
passengers sat in the back while the white passengers sat in the front.235 Again in
the initial report regarding Rosa Jordan’s shooting the driver of that bus, W.H.
Fullilove, made it clear that black passengers were in the back of the bus while white
passengers took up the spaces in the front.236 Legal integration clearly was not equal
to racial cohesion. The report filed by H.L. Warren was the first reported physical
attack on buses, and the fact that he reported that all the African American
passengers sat in the back while whites sat in the front suggests that perhaps some
of those black passengers were not segregating out of fear but rather something
Montgomery Police Department, “Supplementary Offense Report: H.L. Warren” December 26,
1956. (RPMA)
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else. Perhaps they did not with to sit with the whites who so strongly opposed
integration. Clearly race was still a strong dividing line. African Americans and
whites were choosing to separate themselves on the buses, but held the power to
make that choice. It is this power to choose that so agitated white segregationists as
is evident through the police officer’s desperate attempts to get African Americans
back onto the buses during the boycott. Police did not want African Americans
opting out of segregation as dictated by whites. They previously held authority over
space and ordained where was acceptable for African Americans and where was
not. Montgomery was not the last instance of whites attempting to maintain this
authority and was not the last civil rights battleground that thrust the automobile
onto the frontlines, however it was a moment when the strategy to resist the civil
rights movement, and the strategy to regulate black behavior changed. It was a
moment when lynchings were largely left behind, when police incorporated new
strategies of engaging black motorists. It was the moment that “driving while black”
became an informal offense, one that police continued to use as reason enough to
pull over black motorists.
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“What went through my mind was I felt like I was in the ‘40s or the ‘50s”
—Rodney King

Epilogue
The story of the Civil Rights movement is akin to a game of tug of war; a
continuous and fluid give and take that saw power gained and lost by black
communities and individuals. Following the integration of Montgomery buses the
carpool system dissipated despite the fact that it was more efficient for
Montgomery’s black citizens than the buses ever were. But efficient transportation
was not the primary goal of the MIA, of Rosa Parks, Claudette Colvin, E.D. Nixon,
Martin Luther King, the carpoolers, or any of those involved in the boycott. Their
goal was equality. Similarly as segregation laws lost power over spaces of public
transportation across the country, so too vanished the organized pooling of
automobiles as a means of challenging white supremacy. Public transportation
largely dissipated from the fight for civil rights, and while the freedom riders
certainly tackled issues of transportation, they were aimed at interstate bus laws.
The strategy chosen was to break the state laws and test the will of the Kennedy
administration to enforce federal court rulings, driving integrated buses through the
South. Carpools were not necessary, nor a viable means for challenging the laws as
those riding the integrated buses did so voluntarily, and did not actually need to use
interstate busing as a means of transportation. Unlike the community of
Montgomery, it was not necessary to the riders’ daily lives to ride the buses across
state lines. They did so purely to fight segregation, not establish a better system that
they themselves would continue to regularly use.
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Civil Rights Activists lost the need for black run carpools, as they turned their
attention away from public transportation and towards other spaces controlled by
whites such as public education.237 Integrating Central High School in Little Rock,
Arkansas could not be done through mass automobile action. While cars could get
the nine black children to school in relative safety, they could not keep the children
safe once inside the physical space of the school.238 Likewise carpools could not
theoretically aid those who marched from Selma to Montgomery in protest of Jimmy
Lee Jackson’s slaying and the general lack of black voting rights. The power gained
through that march was specifically drawn from the marching; from the difficulty of
walking the fifty miles through the contested space of rural Alabama.239 The act of
walking specifically meant something there. Carpools did not provide aid to those
fighting for civil rights in schools and polling stations and two factors best explain
this: the aforementioned lack of further issues pertaining to the pairing of
segregation and public transportation, and the individualization of black car culture.
When Montgomery police pulled over black drivers, they did so by targeting
a group, yet they questioned individuals and made individuals stop their

Schools are of particular interest as moderate whites in the 1970s found the idea of governmental
control over where they could and could not school their children to be the mobilizing reason for
moderate white resistance to integration as pointed out in Matthew Lassiter, The Silent Majority:
Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.) Indeed whites
seemed to largely ignore the inherent irony in using the control over where their children went to
school to deny African Americans the freedom to break free from segregated school, spaces that the
government, both state and municipal, dictated acceptable or unacceptable for black children.
238A station wagon was the primary mode of transportation that got the nine children to school the
first week, but eventually due to mass hostility from whites, the 101 st airborne division was called in
to escort the children to and within the school. Armed soldiers ensured the relative safety of the
children, and their authority and weapons were largely what maintained that insurance. Mass
carpooling could not provide that same level of safety once the children were inside the space of the
school walls.
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automobiles. The automobile, by design, is geared toward individuality.240 An
individual drives the car; an individual or at most a small group of individuals use
the space within the vehicle while in operation, and police simply could not pull
over a group of cars in any meaningful way.241 In this manner the car also became an
extension of one’s individuality. Throughout the twentieth century African
Americans used cars and customization to express their own individuality, but also
to create a visual representation of their existence.
While the black citizens of Montgomery successfully forced (largely through
the efficient carpool system) the desegregation of the buses, they simultaneously
made the car a symbol toward which whites and police could direct their anger and
hatred. There is perhaps no better illustration of this than the incident of the
motorcycle officer throwing acid on Reverend Lambert’s brand new Mercury.242
Cars were given a deeper symbol of freedom by the boycotters, and also became a
physical target for white frustration. Similarly, with the collapse of segregated
transportation, black motorists became the subjects of directed white irritation as
Montgomery officers continued to pull over black motorists for being black and
driving cars.243
Throughout the boycott police officers in Montgomery self reported pulling
over black drivers due to their race, explicitly stating that they pulled over any cars
“hauling negroes,” however the admittance of this practice existing was a rarity
John Heitmann, The Automobile and American Life (New York: McFarland, 2009), 4.
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following the Civil Rights Movement, and it is often difficult to demonstrate that any
traffic stop was solely based on race.244 Regardless of the difficulty one does not
have to look too hard to see that a pattern of police behavior emerged, and
continues in present day. Montgomery police officers did not try to hide the fact that
a black driver’s blackness was, in their minds, enough to justify pulling the driver
over, recording their license, address, make and model of the car, questioning them
and often times ticketing the driver and or placing them under arrest.245 This
behavior became commonplace. And reactions to it could turn violent.
In 1967 after a string of riots, the largest of which took place in Detroit,
Michigan, President Lyndon B. Johnson established the Kerner Commission, led by
Governor Otto Kerner Jr. of Illinois, and charged it with the task of determining the
underlying causes of the riots. The Kerner Commission interviewed over 130 people
and one of the most common complaints among the testimonials was police abuse of
power, specifically, “the stoppage of Negroes on foot or in cars without obvious
basis.”246 Police harassment was certainly nothing new, but stopping black drivers
for being black was one of the latest evolutions in police regulation of black
behavior.
The

commission

did

not

address

police

traffic

stops

in

their

recommendations.247 The commission did however address rampant racism across
the country stating, “Segregation and poverty have created in the racial ghetto a
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destructive environment totally unknown to most white Americans.”248 The report
continued explaining, “What white Americans have never fully understood but what
the Negro can never forget—is that white society, is deeply implicated in the ghetto.
White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it and white society
condones it.”249 The white maintenance and condoning of systems that generate
poverty among certain African American communities are behaviors that still need
addressing. Racialized traffic stops, and violent racist dealings with African
American motorists did not subside following the turbulent 60s, and riots continued
to be a common response. Also continued was the “breaking up of street groups,
indiscriminate stops and searches [which] is frequently directed at youths, creating
special tensions in the ghetto where the average age is generally under 21.”250 It is of
little wonder then why African American males under the age of twenty-one
disproportionately make up the prison population. They are pulled over at higher
rates, questioned at higher rates, and detained at higher rates so it should be no
question then as to why they are convicted at higher rates.251 The automobile
continued to be a space in which African Americans found themselves at the mercy
of police action.252
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On March 3, 1991 Rodney King, a taxi driver in Los Angeles was driving home
after drinking beers and watching a basketball game with friends. King was followed
by police officers and attempted to evade them after they signaled for King to pull
over. King led officers on a high-speed chase, and after being cornered, King and the
other passengers were ordered out of the car. King’s passengers, Bryant Allen and
Freddie Helms, were manhandled, racially taunted, kicked and stomped. King, with
his hands up, was tazed by officers twice and then beaten by officers who kicked
him and used batons to strike him multiple times.253 The majority of the attack was
caught on camera by George Holiday, who upon seeing the incident from his house,
grabbed his camera and filmed as five officers struck King over and over with their
batons. The shaky, low-resolution video clearly shows officers hitting King in the
legs, torso, back and head, while also repeatedly kicking King who slowly rolled on
the ground. King was then placed in handcuffs, dragged to the side of the road, and
finally put in the backseat of a patrol car.254
King never demonstrated any resistance once emerging from the police car.
Police never successfully documented any initial reason for attempting to pull King
over in the first place, and while it was later discovered that King was in fact
inebriated, officers were not aware of this while in pursuit of King. The officers that
initially tried to pull King over explained that King was slightly speeding, although
they had no evidence to substantiate their claims. He was yet another black driver

profiling which was largely unreported by newspapers until the late 1980s and early 1990s. Likely
oral history will play a major role in uncovering these stories.
253 “Passenger Describes L.A. Police Department Beating of Driver, Calls it Racial,” The New York
Times, March 21, 1991.
254 George Holiday, “Rodney King Beating Video” www.rodenykingvideo.com accessed May 14, 2015.
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pulled over for “suspicious behavior” which more often than not should be read as
“being black.” King and his automobile, like the automobiles and carpoolers in 1956
Montgomery, was guilty of driving while black.
The video was shown to the public by numerous television news stations,
and resulted in the officers being brought to trial. The trial took place over a year
after King’s beating and resulted in the exoneration of the five officers that beat
King, sparking a wave of violence and riots in Los Angeles and surrounding areas, as
well as some other major cities across the country.255 It was a rare moment. The
beating of a black motorist was not a novel occurrence, nor were riots caused by
racial tension, but Holiday’s capturing of the incident on film certainly was
uncommon and placed police misconduct on national television showing the
American public what the ramification can be for being black and driving an
automobile.256
The phenomenon of “driving while black” is much more commonplace than
headlines of it are. In fact the practice is treated as a fact of life that African
Americans are forced to live with. In a 1999 issue of Ebony, journalist Joy Bennett
Kinnon tried to explain a wave of attacks on black motorists at the hands of police
Robert D. McFadden, “Riots in Los Angeles: Eruption; Some Violence on the Streets of New York,”
The New York Times, May 2, 1992.
256This points to another drastically important technological system in the history of black motorists’
encounters with police, and encounters with police in general: the handheld video camera. While it is
not within the scope of this study to delve deeper into the ramifications of the mass distribution and
consumption of handheld video cameras in American society (both black and white) it is a
nonetheless a significant development in American culture and society, particularly in African
American culture as nearly every modern reported police beating or shooting of African Americans
that makes its way into mass news media is accompanied by film footage often recorded by the
cellphones of onlookers. With widespread video coverage, abuses of power are continually being
caught on tape, and thus hard evidence can be brought against the officers involved, seen by the
American public, and credibility can be given to the claims of widespread racism.
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officers, and included in the article a short public service announcement entitled,
“What To Do If You Are Caught Driving While Black.”257 The suggestions were
however not Kinnon’s creation but rather were produced by the NAACP, the
National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE), and Allstate
Insurance Foundation. Kinnon explained that the three organizations produced a
pamphlet aimed at instructing, “young Blacks on their rights and how to avoid a
situation that could escalate into brutality.” 258 The suggestions include eight
separate steps that include overtly calm and “polite” behavior, carrying a lawyer’s
phone number, and consistent direct communication of one’s actions with the
police. These are words that African American motorists must live by if they want to
decrease their chances of violent altercations with police when in the midst of a
traffic stop. These are not just unspoken rules, but now published guidelines that
dictate social interaction, and are signifiers of minority motorists’ lack of power to
change those rules. The fact that the NAACP, NOBLE, and particularly Allstate
produced this pamphlet speaks to the pervasive nature of racism dictating the
interaction of minority traffic stops. While NOBLE and the NAACP both focus their
efforts on African American social issues, Allstate Insurance does not make a habit
of addressing racism on the road. It is a sign that the company acknowledged that
“driving while black” was significantly affecting a large portion of those insured by
the company, and Allstate wanted those customers to know they were aware of the

Joy Bennett Kinnon, “DWB, Driving While Black: What’s Behind The Wave Of Attacks On Black
Motorists?,” Ebony, September 1999, 66.
258 Kinnon, “DWB, Driving While Black: What’s Behind The Wave Of Attacks On Black Motorists?,” 66.
257

107
practice and wanted to help assuage interactions between minority motorists and
police.
Kinnon supplements the list ending the article with a quote from the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) stating, “No person of color is safe from this
treatment anywhere, regardless of their obedience to the law, their age, the type of
car they drive or their station in life. In short skin color has become evidence of the
propensity to commit crime, and police use this ‘evidence’ against minority drivers
on the road all the time.”259 The ACLU was well aware that minorities and whites
operated under different social rules when interacting with police while on the road.
The ACLU explicitly stated how often race was used as the motivating factor for
traffic stops and ensuing brutality. With the advent of video cameras nearly
everywhere, it is no surprise that the American media increasingly found stories and
footage of the unfolding of “driving while black” instances. Indeed “waves” (as
Kinnon called it) of these cases continued to be thrust into headlines.
One of the latest cases of driving while black thrown to the front of media
headlines came in April of 2015 when Walter Scott an African American motorist
was stopped in his 1991 Mercedes by North Charleston police office Michael Slager
for having his vehicle exhibiting a broken taillight. While broken taillights are not
cause enough to make a traffic stop in North Charleston, South Carolina, officer
Slager signaled Scott to pull over. Scott, who was heading to an auto parts store to
fix his taillight, fled his vehicle after Slager’s initial contact.260 An onlooker captured
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the event that followed on camera through the use of his smartphone. The video
shows Scott running from Slager, and then the officer shooting Scott in the back
eight times. Following the shooting, the officer can be seen calling the incident in,
and while other officers arrive on seen, Slager drops a gun shaped object onto the
body of Michael Scott.261 Slager later claimed that Scott attempted to grab the tazer
secured on Slager’s belt, however in the video it appears as though the officer drops
the tazer onto Scott’s body after shooting Scott and placing him in handcuffs. 262
Scott was yet another victim guilty of driving while black, and Slager yet another
officer who, because of Scott’s skin color, chose to pull a black driver over. This is
the pattern that can be seen amongst the traffic stops in Montgomery during the
boycott, the stop of King, and countless other cases since the bus boycott: black
drivers pulled over, and the encounter ranging from minor secondary charges to
police shootings of the driver. The pattern continues.
While it is certainly not the historian’s job to predict or create solutions for
the problems that grip the past, and often the present, there is one suggestion that
must be made. The United States would do well to remember the advice given by the
Kerner Commission. To deny the existence of widespread cyclical patterns and
presences of racism is to deny history. Too often are repudiations of racial problems
heard through the halls of even the highest learning institutions and from those with
the highest degrees in their field. Racism today exists in more subtle forms than in
the early twentieth century. It is not as blatantly obvious as a streetcar operator
“Video Shows Fatal Police Shooting,” The New York Times, April 7, 2015.
“White South Carolina Policeman Charged With Murdering Black Man,” The New York Times, April
28, 2015.
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abusing black passengers while yelling racial epithets; not as obvious as a bus driver
demanding that black passengers move to the back of the bus. Instead it goes unsaid
and unpronounced. It is no longer as Martin Luther King Jr. put it, “dripping” from
southern mouths.263 Instead it can be heard muffled through words like “thug” and
“hoodlum.” In the wake of the riots that broke out in Baltimore in April of 2015, in
an interview on CNN, Baltimore City Councilman Carl Stokes voiced his frustration
over hidden yet ubiquitous racism explaining, “Of course its not the right word to
call our children thugs. These are children who have been set aside, marginalized,
who have not been engaged by us. No we do not have to call them thugs….So calling
them thugs, just call them niggers.”264 Similarly it is unlikely that police officers
make conscious decisions based upon race when pulling over automobiles operated
by African Americans, however racial bias and tension is still at play.
In 1956 Montgomery, it was clear that officers thought, “they are black, I will
pull them over,” but as time progressed the word black became substituted for the
word suspicious in justifying police interactions with black motorists. Often racism
has bled unknowingly into individual and communal perceptions of people and
cultures, and there become two victims of racism: those who it is directed at, and
those who fall prey to its grip. Rarely are children raised as they once were to
consciously hate African Americans. Instead racism is passed on through depictions
in the media, through honest misconceptions about groups of people, through
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subtlety.265 The Subject of race makes people afraid, but it cannot be avoided. It has
not died off due to ignoring it.
The story of black automobility is an unfinished one, with much left to
uncover and still much more to be written, however from the pieces known,
knowledge can be gleaned. Through pooling resources African Americans gained an
immense amount of power found in the changing of social rules of interaction.
African American jitney owners and operators forced jitney corporations and white
supremacists to restructure laws, and however brief, provided African Americans a
viable option for avoiding the hostile spaces of segregated public transportation.
Black carpoolers through constructing an efficient means of boycotting the
segregated buses similarly established a system that empowered black passengers,
drivers, business owners, and laborers. The carpools were the key to changing the
rules that regulated the social life of public transportation in Montgomery, Alabama.
Unknowingly they also changed the rules that established social interactions
between black motorists and police; rules that still linger. As is all too common
though, there are still many gaps to be filled. The job of the historian is yet again
unfinished, and this study is merely a mile marker. The intersection of race and the
technological system of the automobile is an important one, with long lasting
impacts across a range of cultural and social understandings and just as the
automobile has been a tool in reshaping the physical, economic, political, and
cultural structures of the world, it has similarly reshaped the many nuances of racial
interactions.
265
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